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REINFORCING REPRESENTATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE 
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS IN THE REHNQUIST AND 
WAITE COURTS 
Ellen D. Katz* 
INTRODUCTION 
A large body of academic scholarship accuses the Rehnquist Court 
of "undoing the Second Reconstruction,"1 just as the Waite Court has 
* Assis tan t Prof essor of Law, Univ ersi ty of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1991, J.D. 1994, 
Yal e. - Ed. Thanks to Evan Camink er, Dani el Halb ers tam, Rick Has en, Don H erzog, Rick 
Hills, D eborah Malamud, Rick Pild es, Richard Primus, and R eb ecca Sco tt for h elpful discus­
sions and comm en ts, and to par ticipan ts in th e Nin th Ira C. Ro thg erb er, Jr. Conf er enc e on 
Cons erva tiv e Judicial Ac tivism, h eld a t  th e Univ ersi ty of Colorado, Oc tob er 19-20, 2001, a t  
which an earli er v ersion of this pap er was pr es en ted. Thanks also to Dani el Lo effl er and 
Wad e G en tz for r es earch assis tanc e, and to th e Univ ersi ty of Michigan Law School, which 
provid ed g en erous financial suppor t for this proj ec t  through th e Cook Endowm en t. 
1. See, e.g. , J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 2, 67- 68, 3 68 (1999) (argu­
ing tha t  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and i ts prog eny " thr ea ten [) to r ev ers e th e cours e 
of minori ty poli tical succ ess during th e S econd R econs truc tion"); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
L evinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1097-99 (2001) 
(arguing tha t  "in may ways, th e cons ti tu tional vision of th e cons erva tiv e [m emb ers of th e 
R ehnquis t Cour t] r es embl es th e in terpr eta tion of th e Nor th ern D emocra ts who w er e  hos til e 
to R econs truc tion"); Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the 
Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 859 (2002) (arguing tha t  
d ecisions by th e R ehnquis t and Wai te Cour ts similarly r es tric t civil-righ ts laws); N eil 
Go tanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 ,  68 (1991) 
(d escribing th e 1989 civil-righ ts d ecisions of th e Supr em e  Cour t as " th e  equival en t  of th e 
Compromis e of 1877, which end ed th e firs t R econs truc tion"); Virginia E. H ench, The Death 
of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 727, 755 & nn.131-32 (1998) (arguing tha t  th e R ehnquis t Cour t is "squar ely a t  th e for e­
fron t  of 1 9 th C en tury jurisprud enc e, adop ting th e ra tional es tha t  w er e  us ed to s trik e down 
th e original pos t-Civil War Civil Righ ts S ta tu tes"); John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five and the 
Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 
1093, 109 6 (2000) (s ta ting tha t  sp ecific R ehnquis t Cour t d ecisions r efl ec t  an "An ti­
R econs truc tion . . .  'philosophy ' tha t has b een adop ted and impos ed on our coun try by th e 
Gang of Fiv e" and arguing tha t  "w e ar e wi tn essing th e r eturn of an An ti-R econs truc tion Su­
pr em e  Cour t"); Jam es Thomas Tuck er, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Con­
sent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 5 61 (1999) 
(arguing tha t  th e end of th e S econd R econs truc tion has r esul ted from "judicial in transi­
g enc e" similar to tha t  which end ed th e Firs t) ;  Pam ela S. Karlan, End of the Second Recon­
struction? Voting Rights and the Court, NATION, May 23, 1994, a t  698, 700 [h er einafter Kar­
lan, End of the Second Reconstruction?] (arguing tha t  " th e  Supr em e  Cour t has r el en tl essly 
chipp ed away a t  th e founda tions of th e S econd R econs truc tion"). 
2341 
2342 Michigan Law Review [Vo l. 101:2341 
long been blamed for facilitating the end of the First.2 This critique 
captures much3 of what is meant by those generally charging 
the Rehnquist Court with "conservative judicial activism."4 It posits 
that the present Court wants to dismantle decades' worth of federal 
antidiscrimination measures that are aimed at the "reconstruction" of 
public and private relationships at the local level.5 It sees the Waite 
Court as having similarly nullified the civil-rights initiatives enacted by 
Congress following the Civil War to reconstruct the former Confeder­
acy. And it maintains that both Courts' willingness to invalidate fed­
eral statutes and limit congressional power evinces the view that much 
2. See sourc es cit ed infra not e 3 6  and accompanying t ext. 
3 .  But not all . See Balkin & L e.vinson, supra not e 1, at 1045-51 (critiquing Bush v. Gor e, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000), as an exampl e of cons ervativ e judicial activism); see also P et er M. Shan e, 
Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gor e Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for 
Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. S T. U. L. R EV. 535, 582 (2002). 
4. For claims that th e R ehnquist Court engag es in cons ervativ e judicial activism, s ee, for 
exampl e, Balkin & L evinson, supra not e 1, at 1081; Erwin Ch em erinsky, The Religious Free­
dom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 
602 (1998) [h er einaft er Ch em erinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitu­
tional Expansion of Rights] (d escribing various f ed era lism d ecisions as displaying "cons erva­
tiv e judicia l activism"); Scott Fru ehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in 
Theory and Practice, 83 MARO. L. REV . 435, 441 (1999) (stating that "th e n ew judicia l activ­
ism . . .  employ[s] g en eral notions of f ed eralism that ar e not anchor ed in th e Constitution's 
words" and "ignor e[s] som e of its basic principl es in c ertain cas es [and] produc e[s] r esults . ,. 
that ar e unprincip led and ev en id eo logically bias ed"); St ev en A. Light, Too (Color)blind to 
See: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Rehnquist Court, 8 GEO. MASON U. Crv. R TS. 
L.J. 1 ,  3 (1997-1998) (stating that "th e conv erg enc e of judicial activism and id eologica l con­
s ervatism that charact eri zes th e R ehnquist Court . . .  sugg ests that th e S econd R econstruc­
tion is at a turning point" (int ernal citation omitt ed)); P et er M. Shan e, Federalism's "Old 
Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 
(2000); and Larry D. Kram er, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, D ec. 12, 2000, 
at A33 (arguing that "[t]h e R ehnquist Court has b een using law to r eshap e politics for at a 
l east a d ecad e" and that "cons ervativ e judicial activism is th e ord er of th e day") . 
5. C. Vann Woodward coin ed th e phras e "S econd R econstruction" in 19 65 to d escrib e a 
s eri es of th en-n ew f ed eral civil-rights initiativ es. C. Vann Woodward, From the First Recon­
struction to the Second, HARPER'S MAG., Apr . 19 65, at 127. Th e phras e is now und erstood to 
encompass a wid e rang e of f ed eral mandat es and programs. See, e.g. , KOUSSER, supra not e 
1, at 12-13 (d escribing 1982 Am endm ents to th e Voting Rights Act as part of th e S econd R e­
construction); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, 
B rown , and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B. C. L .  REV. 73, 1 61 (1998) (cat egori zing th e 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 as "p erhaps . . .  [th e] last r econstructiv e mom ent" of th e S econd R e­
construction); Chandl er Davidson & B ernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Sec­
ond Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS A CT, 19 65-1 990, at 378, 383-8 6 ( Chandl er Davidson & B ernard Grofman eds., 1994) 
(sam e); Rob ert C. Post & R eva B. Si eg el, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimina­
tion Legislation After Morrison and Kim el, 1 10 YALE L.J. 441 , 448 & nn.24-25 (2000) (d e­
scribing th e Am ericans with Disabiliti es Act ("ADA"), th e Vio lenc e Against Wom en Act 
("VA WA"), and th e Fr eedom of Acc ess to Clinic Entranc es Act of 1994 as part of th e S ec­
ond R econstruction); Micha el J. Zim er, Taxman : Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1 
U .  PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 234 (1998) (stating that th e Civil Rights Act of 1991 "r evi­
tali z[ ed] th e S econd R econstruction"); see also NUMAN v. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM, 
SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 19 (1975); MANNING 
MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK 
AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2nd ed . 1991) . 
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federal civil-rights legislation represents an impermissible redistribu­
tive project and an unconstitutional interference with state and local 
autonomy.6 
This Article argues that the critique that the Rehnquist Court is 
"undoing the Second Reconstruction" is too simple, but not only be­
cause it fails to account for last Term's relatively "moderate" deci­
sions.7 A parallel indeed exists between the Rehnquist Court's 
response to the Second Reconstruction and the Waite Court's reaction 
to the First. Decisions by both Courts, however, respond to Recon­
struction not with undifferentiated hostility, but instead in a more 
complex manner. This Article attempts to show that these decisions 
posit a two-tiered vision of Congress's enforcement powers under 
the Reconstruction-era Amendments. Under this vision, Congress 
possesses broad discretion to free state political processes of racial 
discrimination,8 but enjoys far more limited authority to combat other 
forms of discrimination at the state and local level. 
This disaggregation of Congress's enforcement powers may be 
understood to reflect the view that individual liberty is best protected 
at the state level, but only so long as the "healthy organization of the 
government itself" is maintained.9 State government must represent 
"the free choice of the people,"10 but racial discrimination in voting 
prevents States from fulfilling this function. Decisions by both Courts 
accord deference to congressional efforts to block such discrimination 
and thereby to reinforce representative governance at the state level. 
They countenance this broad congressional power in order to preserve 
the primacy of state authority elsewhere. 1 1  
6. See, e.g. , Balk in & Lev inson, supra note 1 ,  at  1052-61 (argu ing that " [ i)n the past ten 
years, the Supreme Court o f  the Un ited States has begun a systemat ic reappra isal o f  doc­
tr ines concern ing federal ism, rac ial equal ity, and c iv il r ights that, if fully success ful, w il l  
redraw the const itut ional map as we have known it"); Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 441; 
Nowak, supra note 1, at 1098 (stat ing that "the Gang o f  F ive cannot d isgu ise the fact that 
they have noth ing but d isda in for the federal system that our country adopted both in 1787 
and follow ing the Civ il War"); Jed Ruben feld, The Anti Anti-Discrimination Agenda, 1 1 1  
YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 (2002) (stat ing that "some o f  the Court's federal ism cases are not 
really federal ism cases at a l"); see also Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative 
Politics, 73 U. CO LO. L. REV. 1 139 (2002) (d iscuss ing elements thought to compr ise conser­
vat ive jud ic ial act iv ism). 
7. See, e. g. ,Grutter v. Boll inger, 1 23 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Nevada Dep't o f  Human Res. v. 
H ibbs, 1 23 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); see also Tony Mauro, A Timeout for Conservative Agenda, 
LEGAL TIMES, June 30, 2003, at 1 ;  Ed itor ial, A Moderate Term on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2003, § 4, at 12 (stat ing "the h ighest court o f  all has surpr ised many people with its 
moderat ion"). 
8. See infra Parts I & II. 
9. Ex parte Yarbrough, 1 10 U.S. 651 ,  666 (1884); see also infra note 293 and accompa­
ny ing text. 
10. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666. 
11. See infra Part III. 
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The first two Parts of this Article seek to establish that decisions by 
both Courts defer more to congressional efforts to rid local political 
processes of racial discrimination than to other types of congressional 
antidiscrimination measures. These Parts do not argue that both 
Courts deliberately set out to recognize a special realm in which they 
would defer to congressional power and indeed take no position 
on the justices' subjective motivation on this point. Nor do they main­
tain that deference in this realm necessarily precludes deference to 
Congress in other arenas.12 Instead, they locate within decisions by 
both Courts evidence that both defer considerably to Congress in the 
realm of race and the vote. 
Part I discusses a series of Waite Court decisions that circumscribe 
congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction-era Amend­
ments. Scholars frequently cite United States v. Reese,13 United States v. 
Cruikshank,14 United States v. Harris, 15 and the Civil Rights Cases16 as 
evidence of the Waite Court's resistance to the First Reconstruction's 
political project.17 The Waite Court threw out federal indictments, 
opined unnecessarily on a host of constitutional questions, and invali­
dated federal enforcement legislation as falling outside congressional 
12. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), for example, suggests 
that the Court may also defer to congressional efforts to combat gender discrimination. The 
scope of such a principle and the strength of the Court's commitment to it are as yet unclear. 
Hibbs holds that state employees may recover money damages in federal court if a state em­
ployer violates the family care provisions under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA"). Id. at 197 6. States typically enjoy immunity from such suits, see, e.g. , Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (199 6), and, in recent years, the Court has struck down 
congressional efforts to abrogate this immunity in statutes quite similar to the FMLA. See 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 35 6 (2001) (holding unconstitutional 
attempted abrogation of state immunity in the ADA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (same, for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")). Hibbs 
accordingly surprised many observers by upholding the FMLA as a permissible exercise of 
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., 
Court Surprises With Family Leave Act Ruling, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 30, 2003, at 21 
(quoting Nina Pillard, who argued for Hibbs, as stating that "[i)t certainly was the case that 
the smart money was on my opponents" and citing speculation that Hibbs had a "95 % 
chance" of losing (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at LEXIS, ABA Library, 
ERPORT File. Denying any conflict with precedent, Hibbs insists that the heightened judi­
cial scrutiny accorded to gender-based distinctions provides Congress greater leeway to craft 
statutes such as the FMLA than it enjoys when it targets discrimination against nonsuspect 
groups. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. That leeway, however, requires not only the targeting of 
gender-based discrimination, but also a statutory remedy that falls comfortably within Con­
gress's commerce power. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (rejecting con­
gressional power to subject private parties to liability under the VA WA); see also Marcia 
Coyle, Follow the People, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at Sl (noting tensions between Hibbs 
and Morrison). 
13. 92 U.S. 214 (187 6). 
14. 92 U.S. 542 (187 6). 
15. 10 6 U.S. 629 (1883). 
1 6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) . 
17. See sources cited infra notes 3 6, 54. 
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authority. And yet the Court left open significant opportunities for 
Congress to reach deeply into local affairs to protect black-voting 
strength.18 
Part II identifies a similar proclivity in a series of Rehnquist Court 
decisions that address Congress's power to frame antidiscrimination 
measures. City of Boerne v. Flores19 circumscribes congressional power 
to enforce the Reconstruction-era Amendments.20 Boerne and nearly 
all of its progeny21 invalidate congressional statutes, exhibit a prefer­
ence for state and local power over federal authority,22 and evince a 
seeming antipathy to federal civil-rights initiatives and the social engi­
neering they represent.23 All the Boerne cases, however, self­
consciously preserve precedent upholding provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act ("VRA") against constitutional challenge.24 They do so 
notwithstanding the displacement of local autonomy that results from 
enforcement of the VRA's race-conscious antidiscrimination princi­
ples,25 and the seeming doctrinal inconsistencies that exist between these 
cases and the Boerne doctrine.26 
The Rehnquist Court's careful preservation of the VRA precedent 
becomes even more puzzling when juxtaposed with much of the Court's 
contemporary voting-rights decisions. The constitutional injury recog­
nized in Shaw v. Reno21 and its progeny28 hinders the easy deployment of 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
20. See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) [hereinafter Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Con­
straints on Section 5 Powers]; see also infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (discussing 
the novelty of the Boerne holdings and their departure from precedent). 
21. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. 
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The 
exception is Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). See supra 
note 12. 
22. See infra notes 1 15-123 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 525; see also infra notes 115-123 and accom­
panying text. 
24. The Boerne decisions preserve City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); and 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See infra notes 157-159 and accompany­
ing text (discussing preservation of VRA precedent in Boerne decisions). 
For a discussion of the history and structure of the VRA, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET 
AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, 546-48, 556-57 (2d ed. 2001). 
25. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal inconsisten­
cies between the early VRA precedent and the Boerne decisions). 
27. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
28. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. 
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
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race-conscious districting practices.29 Miserly readings of the VRA in 
several cases over the past decade accord Congress insufficient defer­
ence.30 Read together, these decisions appear to manifest hostility to 
the VRA and to the larger federal project of which it is a central 
component.31And yet, as Part II argues, they do not disavow broad 
congressional power to block racial discrimination in voting. Instead, 
they reflect the Court's judgment that the United States Department 
of Justice ("DOJ'') and state officials have relied too prominently 
and rigidly on race when regulating political processes and have 
misconstrued the VRA as providing authority to do so.32 
Parts III and IV offer and evaluate an explanation for why deci­
sions by both the Rehnquist and Waite Courts might recognize a 
distinctly broad congressional power to address racial discrimination 
in voting. The goal is not to establish subjective motivation, but 
instead to off er a conceptual framework grounded in decisional text 
that might explain the doctrinal path followed by both Courts. 
Part III argues that decisions by both the Waite and Rehnquist 
Courts defer to congressional power in the realm of race and the vote 
as a means to reinforce representative governance at the state level. 
Implicit in these decisions is the conviction that state governments 
best protect individual liberty, and that only inclusive electoral proce­
dures enable the State to perform this protective role. Fostering effec­
tive state governance is thought to render unnecessary more intrusive 
and extensive federal regulation, and thus most faithfully to comport 
with the federal structure.33 
Part IV explores the limits of the Rehnquist Court's deferential 
stance toward Congress. The constitutionality of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act is currently an open question.34 This Part argues 
that the Court should uphold its validity insofar as the deference 
it presently accords Congress reflects a functional understanding of 
congressional power to reinforce representation in the states. Never­
theless, the realm in which racial discrimination affects the political 
process is potentially vast, and numerous competing and controversial 
techniques are available to address such discrimination. Left 
unchecked, congressional power in this realm might easily become 
29. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier 
Parish II]; Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (hereinafter Bossier Parish 
!]; Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 
(1992); see also Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); infra notes 221-225, 234-244 and ac­
companying text. 
31. See infra Section H.B. 
32. See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 276-277 and accompanying text. 
34. See sources cited infra note 356 and accompanying text. 
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plenary over an immense range of conduct. Precedent suggests that 
the Rehnquist Court will not countenance such an expansion of 
congressional power. The Court may accordingly seek to cabin con­
gressional authority by decreeing only limited conduct to be suffi­
ciently voting-related to warrant congressional proscription. And, as 
Bush v. Gore35 indicates, it may be willing to identify new substantive 
constitutional norms governing democratic structure. These norms, in 
turn, may curtail congressional discretion to regulate the political pro­
cess. Such efforts may render section 2 invalid, and, more broadly, 
eliminate entirely the realm in which the Court presently defers to 
Congress. Were the Court to do so, it would indeed "undo" the 
Second Reconstruction. 
I. THE WAITE COURT AND THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS 
The critique that the Rehnquist Court is undoing the Second 
Reconstruction evokes the longstanding assessment that the Waite 
Court contributed significantly to the end of the First.36 Read together, 
decisions such as United States v. Reese,37 United States v. Cruikshank,38 
35. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
36. For this critique of the Waite Court, see, for example, HAROLD M. HYMAN & 
WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
1835-1875, at 488 (1982) (crediting the Waite Court with leading "the judicial retreat from 
Reconstruction"); RAYFORD w. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 105-06 (enlarged 
ed. 1965) (noting role of Waite Court in the demise of Reconstruction); Davidson & 
Grofman, supra note 5, at 378 (characterizing "the complicity of the federal courts" as a nec­
essary component of southern redemption); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of 
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-37 (1952) (describing Waite Court de­
cisions along with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), as a "Li]udicial 
[c]oup d'[e]tat" in which "the bold motives and the brave arguments of the architects of the 
constitutional revolution in civil rights were forgotten under the din of a judicial rewriting of 
their efforts"); and Karlan, End of the Second Reconstruction?, supra note 1, at 698 (arguing 
that during the 1870s and 1880s, "the Court gutted the First Reconstruction by invalidating 
or misconstruing a series of critical Congressional protections of black political and eco­
nomic rights"). See also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing historians' assess­
ment of Reese and Cruikshank). 
But see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 148-85 (1988) (characterizing various decisions by the 
Waite Court as moderate and balanced); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Re­
construction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 63 ("[W]hat is remarkable is the 
degree to which the [Waite] Court sustained national authority to protect rights rather than 
the degree to which [it] restricted it."); Earl M. Maltz, The Waite Court and Federal Power to 
Enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR 75, 
80-81 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1996) (stating that "to describe the analysis of the Waite Court 
as unremittingly conservative would be a mistake" and arguing that the Court's "jury dis­
crimination and voting rights cases reflect sympathy for the major elements of the Republi­
can theory of federal power"). Cf Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction, the Waite Court and the 
Politics of History, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR, supra, at 99, 102 (noting 
the revisionist argument that "far from betraying the political values of the Republicans who 
fashioned the Reconstruction Amendments, the Waite Court Justices rather faithfully 
mirrored those values"); infra notes 85-11 1  and accompanying text. 
37. 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 
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United States v. Harris,39 and the Civil Rights Cases40 undeniably 
restricted congressional power to enforce the newly ratified Recon­
struction-era Amendments. And yet, the Waite Court's resistance 
to congressional reconstruction was not steadfast. As Reese and 
Cruikshank make clear, the Waite Court did not hesitate to overturn 
federal convictions and invalidate congressional enforcement legisla­
tion. But even as it did so, the Waite Court left open opportunities for 
the exercise of broad congressional power to reach deeply into local 
affairs to block efforts meant to curb or eliminate black-voting 
strength. 
· 
At issue in United States v. Reese were federal indictments charging 
two municipal-election inspectors with violating sections 3 and 4 of the 
Enforcement Act of 1870.41 The indictments alleged that the inspec­
tors refused to accept payment of a poll tax proffered by an otherwise 
qualified black voter "because of (his] race. "42 Chief Justice Waite's 
majority opinion construes sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act to 
transcend race-based denials of the vote and to encompass wrongful 
denials of the vote more generally.43 Based on this interpretation, 
Reese holds that the statutory provisions exceeded Congress's 
enforcement power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.44 
"Congress can interfere" in state elections, Reese states, only when a 
State "wrongful(ly] refus(es] to receive the vote of a qualified elec­
tor . . . .  because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."45 
38. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
39. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
40. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
41. In relevant part, section 3 provides that "the offer" of a citizen to carry out a state­
mandated prerequisite to voting "be deemed and held as performance in law of such act" if 
the offer "fail[s] to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission afore­
said of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such perform­
ance" and establishes a federal criminal offense for "any judge, inspector, or other officer of 
election . . .  wrongfully [to] refuse or omit to receive, count, certify, register, report, or give 
effect to the vote of such citizen." 
Section 4, in relevant part, establishes a criminal offense for "any person, by force, brib­
ery, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means . . .  (to] hinder, delay, prevent, or ob­
struct, or . . .  (to] combine and confederate with others to (do the same], any citizen from 
doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting at an election as 
aforesaid." Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 1 14, §§ 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36, 37 
(1894). 
42. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216. See generally 2 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION, 1864-1888, at 229-30 (1987);  ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
BLACK SUFFRAGE: LOSING THE VOTE IN REESE AND CRUIKSHANK 65-67 (2001). 
43. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 218, 220. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 218. 
June 2003) Reinforcing Representation 2349 
United States v. Cruikshank46 upholds the release of three white 
men convicted under section 6 of the 1870 Act47 for their participation 
in the Grant Parish Massacre. Following the contested gubernatorial 
election in Louisiana in 1872, and the parallel governments it 
produced, a group of black Republicans assembled in Colfax to defend 
Republican control of the Grant Parish seat. On April 13, 1873, fight­
ing broke out between these forces and white Democrats from the 
countryside. Two white men and dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of 
black men died. Many of the black men were killed after they surren­
dered to the white forces.48 Federal prosecutors indicted ninety-nine of 
the white men involved, prosecuted nine, and obtained convictions 
against three. The trial judges, Circuit Judge Woods and Associate 
Justice Bradley, disagreed over the legality of the convictions, result­
ing in that court granting the defendant's motion to arrest judgment.49 
Cruikshank holds that the indictments failed to charge an interfer­
ence with "any right or privilege granted or secured" by the Constitu­
tion, as required by section 6. According to Chief Justice Waite's 
opinion for the Court, charges alleging interference with the victims' 
voting rights fell short because the indictments did not assert racial 
motivation.50 Alleged deprivations of due process and equal protection 
failed because those Fourteenth Amendment guarantees did not "add 
any thing [sic] to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitu­
tion against another."51 Alleged denials of the right to assemble and 
the right to bear arms were deficient because the Constitution guaran-
46. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
47. Section 6 of the 1870 Act provides: 
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the pub­
lic highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provisions of this act, 
or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his 
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Con­
stitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such per­
sons shall be held guilty of felony . . . .  
Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 1 14, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (codified as amended at 18  U.S.C. § 241 
(2000)). 
48. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 530 (1st ed. 1988) (describing the massacre as the "bloodiest single act of carnage in 
all of Reconstruction"); GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 42-50; ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, 
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 175 (1985); TED TUNNELL, CRUCIBLE OF 
RECONSTRUCTION: WAR, RADICALISM, AND RACE IN LOUISIANA 1862-1877, at 189-92 
(1984); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY 135-37 (1997). 
49. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 708 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897). 
50. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876) (noting that " [w)e may sus­
pect that race was the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred"). 
51. Id. at 554-55. 
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teed those rights only against congressional encroachment.52 Other 
counts were simply too vague.53 
According to scholars of divergent viewpoints, Reese and Cruik­
shank thwarted federal power to protect the southern black popula­
tion and facilitated the end of Reconstruction.54 The two decisions, 
52. Id. at 552-53. 
53. Id. at 557-58. 
54. See, e.g., KEITH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY 15 n.15 (1998) (stating that Reese 
and Cruikshank "gutted the enforcement acts"); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 179-80 (1986) (de­
scribing Cruikshank as holding that "the government could do nothing about a politically 
motivated armed attack by whites that killed sixty blacks" and that Reese "seriously re­
strict(ed] the power of Congress to protect blacks under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments"); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 330-31 (3d ed. 1967) 
(arguing that Reese and Cruikshank "hasten[ed] the end of Reconstruction"); WILLIAM 
GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-79, at 295 (1979) (stating that Reese 
"made future enforcement vastly more difficult, and in some cases clearly impossible"); 
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 36, at 488-89; ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 90-91 
(citing Reese and Cruikshank as decisions that "eviscerated various federal protections of 
black voting rights" and thus as evidence of the Court's "pivotal role" in disenfranchise­
ment); KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 217; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 60-61' 
(1975) (stating that Reese "made the federal guarantee of the right to vote all but worthless" 
and that Cruikshank "doubled the strength of the Court's blow"); KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 
49-50 (citing Reese and Cruikshank as evidence of the Supreme Court's "poten[cy] in pro­
tecting white supremacy in the late nineteenth century"); C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON 
R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 132 (1963) (noting that Reese and Cruikshank 
"arrang[ed] one of the essential conditions for North-South reconciliation: the ending of 
meaningful political participation by the Negro" and made "clear that the Supreme Court 
regarded the Reconstruction era as over"); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE 638 
(3d ed. 2001) (stating that " [t]he effect of the Reese and Cruikshank decisions, combined 
with the Northern loss of will to carry out reconstruction, was to inhibit further enforcement 
efforts"); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 109-14, 150-54 (1966) (describing Reese and Cruikshank 
as damaging to black rights); TUNNELL, supra note 48, at 193 (describing Cruikshank as a 
"racist and morally opaque decision [that] reduced the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Force Acts to meaningless verbiage as far as the civil rights of Negroes were concerned"); 3 
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT JN UNITED STATES HISTORY 326-27, 330 (1922) 
(stating that Reese and Cruikshank rendered the federal enforcement legislation "almost 
wholly ineffective" and characterizing the decisions as "most fortunate" for "largely elimi­
nat[ing] from National politics the Negro question"); Cardyn, supra note 1, at 859 (arguing 
that Reese and Cruikshank "confirmed that the Court was not only determined to avoid con­
fronting squarely the problem of klan violence, but also to downplay those aspects of the 
legislative history of early civil-rights law that were inconsistent with its vision of dual feder­
alism"); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. 
COMMENT. 115, 134 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional 
Moment] (describing Reese and Cruikshank as "major steps toward dismantling the federal 
power to enforce Reconstruction"); Everette Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 
28 J. S. HIST. 202, 209 (1962) (stating that "[t]he effect of [Reese and Cruikshank] was to 
bring to a close the active policy of the government to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment."). 
But see GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 100, 106 (arguing that Reese and Cruikshank reflect 
"moderation in regard to the relationship between the federal government and the states," 
that Reese accepted neither the "strong nationalist position . . .  [nor] extreme states' rights 
constitutionalism," and that Cruikshank "was even more narrow in its result than Reese"); 
Benedict, supra note 36, at 69, 72-74 (describing Reese and Cruikshank to be among deci­
sions in "which the Supreme Court tried to sustain national authority to protect individual 
rights directly without permitting precedents that might later destroy the established limits 
between State and national power"); Maltz, supra note 36, at 77, 80 (arguing that Reese 
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Charles Warren wrote, rendered "the Federal statutes almost wholly 
ineffective to protect the Negro,"55 and "entirely demolished the 
Radical Reconstructionist plan of protecting the rights of the negro by 
direct Federal legislation."56 John Braeman called Reese "a death blow 
to the already faltering efforts to prosecute voting rights violations."57 
Eric Foner described Cruikshank as "[e]ven more devastating" than 
the Slaughter-House Cases, rendering "national prosecution of crimes 
committed against blacks virtually impossible, and g[iving] a green 
light to acts of terror where local officials either could not or would 
not enforce the law."58 
Reese and Cruikshank indisputably hindered ongoing federal 
efforts to enforce the newly ratified Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.59 To be sure, neither decision precluded future federal 
prosecutions under a new statute or a properly crafted indictment.60 
But even a Court steadfastly opposed to Reconstruction might have 
thought political expediency counseled against wholesale invalidation 
of the statutes.61 Both Reese and Cruikshank comport with such 
a stance. They dismiss federal indictments at a time when political 
support for federal intervention in the South was waning. They 
preserve opportunities for future congressional action of the sort the 
Court knew full well Congress would not pursue.62 Absent Reese and 
forged a middle ground that "avoided the political consequences of upholding the prosecu­
tion, while preserving the possibility that a future Congress could intervene on behalf of 
African-American voters if political circumstances changed" and that Cruikshank "strongly 
reaffirmed the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from interfering 
with preexisting fundamental rights"). 
55. 3 WARREN, supra note 54, at 326. 
56. Id. at 324; see also id. at 326-27 (stating that all but the most radical viewed the deci­
sions "to be wise and to open the door for more sane and liberal methods of dealing with the 
negro problem in the South"). 
57. JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 66 (1988). 
58. FONER, supra note 48, at 531. 
59. See WANG, supra note 48, at 130 (stating Reese and Cruikshank "clearly jeopardized 
and discouraged enforcement"); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 100 (noting that "Cruiksliank 
and related cases . . .  made federal prosecutions of violent white supremacists considerably 
more difficult to sustain"); Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212, 218 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 
1970) (noting that Reese and Cruikshank "frustrated federal efforts to bring prosecutions for 
interferences with the Negro's right to vote"). 
60. See Benedict, supra note 36, at 73. 
61. See, e.g., Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 
supra note 20, at 1163 (noting that a series of congressional proposals during the late 1860s 
sought to impose supermajority requirements on Supreme Court adjudication and thereby 
limit the Court's ability to invalidate federal legislation). 
62. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 402 (1985); FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 278 (noting that after Reese, 
"Congress would not mend the statute in accord with the Court's instruction"); GILLETTE, 
supra note 54, at 298 (arguing that Reese and Cruikshank "served to rationalize and legiti-
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Cruikshank, other branches of the federal government would have 
curbed vigorous federal enforcement actions.63 Through these opin­
ions, the Court facilitated this withdrawal by providing a semblance of 
legal justification as support for prevailing political sentiments.64 As 
Professor Currie has explained, "the Court went out of its way to 
incapacitate the enforcement authorities after it was too late politically 
to expect Congress to fill the gap by enacting narrower statutes."65 
Reese, moreover, set free defendants who the Court recognized 
violated the Constitution. It did so based on a strained reading of the 
statute that forced the Court unnecessarily to confront a constitutional 
question.66 The first section of the 1870 Act recognized a right to be 
free of racial discrimination in voting, providing that citizens otherwise 
qualified to vote "shall be entitled and allowed to vote . . .  without 
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."67 
Sections 3 and 4 described statutory offenses based on the wrongful 
conduct "aforesaid."68 The statute, accordingly, could have been read 
mize the earlier retreat during the decisive 1870s when unfavorable public opinion, local 
sabotage, and federal inaction had achieved the overthrow of reconstruction"); WANG, 
supra note 48, at 131; Maltz, supra note 36, at 77 (stating that aggressive federal enforcement 
efforts were unlikely after Republican electoral defeats in 1874); McConnell, The Forgotten 
Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 ("[T]he practical effect [of Reese] was to undo 
a major underpinning of Reconstruction. The supposed defect in the statute could be easily 
remedied, but by 1876 it no longer would be . . . .  "); see also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 
208 (arguing that the Grant administration wanted to abandon "the civil rights enforcement 
efforts that had become so politically debilitating" and thus limited its appeal in Cruikshank 
to voting issues so that "[t]he Justice Department could withdraw gracefully from an unde­
sirable policy under the semblance of a judicial mandate"). 
63. See GILLEITE, supra note 54, at 299; KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 208; 
MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 130 ("Cruikshank and Reese would have provoked outraged 
howls in the 1860's; in 1876 Congress accepted them with the mildest of taps on the Court's 
wrist."); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436 (4th ed. 2001) ("At the 
same time that the Court was dismantling much of the Reconstruction legislation, the politi­
cal coalition behind Reconstruction was also collapsing."); Maltz, supra note 36, at 77. 
64. MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 133 (noting that the Court "marched in step with the 
national mood"). 
65. CURRIE, supra note 62, at 402. 
66. While the modern articulation of the canon of avoiding constitutional questions is 
found in United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson Co. , 213 U.S. 366, 408 
(1909), the doctrine itself originated much earlier. See, e.g, Murray v. The Schooner Charm­
ing Betty, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 
(1800). 
67. In full, section 1 provided: 
That all citizens of the United States who are or shall be otherwise qualified by law to vote at 
any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, 
school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to 
vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servi­
tude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or 
under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140, 140. 
68. See supra note 41. 
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to establish a criminal offense, an element of which was a denial of the 
vote based on a "distinction of race," and not more broadly any 
wrongful denial of the vote.69 The Court held otherwise only by disre­
garding the statute's legislative history,70 and the interpretative canons 
both that penal statutes be strictly construed71 and that all statutes be 
construed to preserve their validity.72 At a minimum, the Court's view 
that the defendants had blocked a voter based on a "distinction of 
race" and thus that statutory provisions were constitutional as applied 
to the defendants should have counseled against invalidating the 
statute in its entirety.73 
Cruikshank, too, opined on constitutional issues the Court might 
have avoided.74 The Grant administration presented the Court with a 
narrow challenge to the lower-court ruling dismissing the indictments, 
taking issue only with the deficiency found in the charges alleging 
interference with the victims' voting rights.75 The defendants filed a 
69. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 241-45 (1876) (Hunt, J., dissenting); see also 
FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 278 (describing as "regrettable" that the Court did not agree 
with Justice Hunt, and stating that, under the statute, "[n)o person accused would be taken 
unawares"); MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 129 (describing Justice Hunt's dissent as forceful); 
Maltz, supra note 36, at 76 (describing Waite's reading as "questionable at best"). 
70. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 241 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (stating that congressional intent that 
the Act protected newly enfranchised black voters from racial discrimination "is too plain to 
be discussed"); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) 
(noting that the statute contains "no provision . . .  but what is intended simply to prevent a 
discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" and that the use 
of "aforesaid" in section 4 "shows clearly enough that the intention of its framers was to con­
fine the operation of that section to offenses against the fifteenth amendment"); FAIRMAN, 
supra note 42, at 231, 235 n.55, 250 (noting that the legislative history "would not sustain" 
the claim that sections 3 and 4 transcended race); Maltz, supra note 36, at 76-77 (stating that 
the debates on the 1870 Act indicate that the statute proscribed only racially motivated acts). 
71. Cf United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (noting rule that "one to whom 
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground 
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which 
its application might be unconstitutional"). 
72. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 402 (stating that the Court "manipulat[ed] the statu­
tory issues of coverage and severability"); McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 
supra note 54, at 134 (describing Reese's "reasoning" as "transparently faulty"). 
73. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 180-81 (1868); CURRIE, supra 
note 62, at 395 n.175 (arguing that "[a]s an original matter of statutory interpretation, it 
would seem odd to conclude that a Congress legislating to protect voting rights would rather 
have no statute at all than a statute limited to offenses based on race" (citing Robert L. 
Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 99 
(1937)); McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 n.64; cf. 
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres­
sive Era: Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 835, 840 n.12 (1982) (arguing that the Court's refusal to limit the statute by 
construction to racially motivated offenses "was certainly defensible"). 
74. See generally William K. Kelley, A voiding Constitutional Questions as a Three­
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 832 n.4 (2001). 
75. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) 
(No. 609) (stating that "we will confine ourselves to the 14th and 16th counts" of the indict­
ment), reprinted in 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
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comprehensive brief arguing that each count of the indictment was 
inadequate.76 In response the Waite Court issued its sweeping exegesis 
not just on the voting counts but also on a host of other issues, includ­
ing equal protection, due process, and incorporation.77 
Cruikshank launched the Waite Court's constriction of Congress's 
enforcement powers under the newly ratified Reconstruction-era 
Amendments.78 Cruikshank asserts that the Equal Protection Clause 
governs state action alone and suggests that Congress may not regu­
late private action pursuant to its enforcement powers. Chief Justice 
Waite's opinion states that " [t]he only obligation resting upon the 
United States is to see that the States do not deny the right . .. .  The 
power of the national government is limited to enforcement of this 
guaranty."79 While arguably dictum in Cruikshank,80 the Waite Court 
gave this suggestion precedential effect in United States v. Harris81 and 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287, 290 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1 97 5) [hereinafter ? LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]; see also FAIRMAN, 
supra note 4 2, at 274 (noting that Cruikshank "was not confined to the counts on which the 
Government had rested" and characterizing the result as "wise, in order that the opinion 
might be more instructive") ; ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 84 (1 960) 
(stating that Cruikshank "went far beyond the necessities of the case to give a very narrow 
construction of the due process and equal protection clauses"). 
7 6. Brief for Defendants, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 54 2 (187 6) (No. 60 9), 
reprinted in 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 7 5, at 347. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 50- 53. 
78. The Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Reconstruction-era Amendments 
and the congressional legislation enforcing them predates the Waite Court. See, e.g. , The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 6 Wall.) 3 6, 78 (1873) (denying that the Fourteenth 
Amendment "radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal 
governments to each other"); Bylew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (187 2) (holding 
that a black murder victim was not "af fect[ed]" by the prosecution of white defendants 
charged with the killing, and hence that the case was not entitled to removal to federal court 
under § 3 of the Civil Rights Act). 
7 9. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555. 
80. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act prohibited interference only with rights "granted o r  
secured" by the Constitution and as such arguably did not proscribe private conduct, at least 
in connection with claimed denials of equal protection and due process. See CURRIE, supra 
note 62, at 3 96 & n.184 (arguing that "Congress had forbidden only violations of the Consti � 
tution" and that the statutory formulation was "properly broad enough to allow Congress t o  
see to it that private persons do not induce or assist the state in denying fourteenth amend " 
ment rights" but did not extend to purely private action) ; Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional 
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 13 53, 1377-
78 (1 964) (asserting that Cruikshank "does not say, nor does it clearly imply that Congress 
has no power to impose new duties on private individuals"); Maltz, supra note 3 6, at 7 9  
(stating that the Cruikshank Court "had been careful to leave open the question of whether 
Congress possessed broad authority to regulate private racially motivated activity"); cf 
McConnell, The Forgotten Constitlllional Moment, supra note 54, at 13 5 (arguing that Cruik­
shank rests on the proposition that private persons cannot violate the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and "(t]hus, the federal government had no power to protect against the private vio­
lence that was the principal means by which white Democrats sought to nullify the 
protections of the law"). 
81. 10 6 u .s. 629 (1883). 
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the Civil Rights Cases.82 These latter decisions do not categorically bar 
Congress from reaching private action in this realm,83 but, in notable 
contravention of the Framers' intent,84 significantly narrow the 
contexts in which such action may be pursued. 
These characteristics notwithstanding, Reese and Cruikshank are 
more narrow, and indeed less damaging to the First Reconstruction, 
than the prevailing critique suggests.85 With regard to blocking racial 
8 2. 10 9 U.S. 3 (1883). 
83. See Harris, 10 6 U.S. at 63 9 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "imposes no 
duty and confers no power upon Congress" to act where state Jaws, as enacted, construed 
and enforced, "recognize and protect the rights of all persons"); The Civil Rights Cases, 10 9 
U.S. at 14 (stating that the contested Jaw was not "corrective of any constitutional wrong 
committed by the States" and was not based on "any supposed or apprehended violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States"); 3 WAR REN, supra note 54, at 33 9 
(stating that under Section 5, "Congress may, within bounds, provide the modes of redress 
against individuals when a State has violated the prohibitions [of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment)"); Benedict, supra note 3 6, at 66- 67 (arguing that Cruikshank and the Civil 
Rights Cases "never rejected absolutely and without cavil" congressional power to protect 
rights violated by state inaction); Frantz, supra note 80, at 1377-81 (arguing that Cruikshank, 
Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases do not adopt "the extreme view that congressional en­
forcement power never extends to 'private acts' "); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 47 6. But 
cf Maltz, supra note 3 6, at 7 9  (arguing that Cruikshank and Harris "had been careful to 
leave open the question of whether Congress possess [sic] broad authority to regulate pri­
vate, racially motivated activity" and that the Civil Rights Cases "largely foreclosed this pos­
sibility"). 
Language in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 ( 2000) , suggests that the Court there 
read Harris and the Civil Rights Cases as establishing this categorical rule, see Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 620- 21, and that Morrison purported to apply it. Id. at 626 (noting that VA WA "is 
not directed at any State or state actor, but at individuals"); see Evan H. Caminker, Private 
Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13 51 ,  13 53 (2000) 
[hereinafter Caminker, Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5] (arguing that Morrison 
affirms private remediation "is a per se inappropriate means of Section 5 enforcement"). 
Even so, the Court's observation that Congress's findings did not support nationwide appli­
cation of the statute, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626- 27, undercuts its suggestion that Congress 
may never reach private action pursuant to its Section 5 powers. See Caminker, supra, at 
13 59-7 2 (arguing that Morrison errs and that private remediation for unconstitutional state 
action can comport with the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and principles of 
federalism); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 443, 44 5 (finding unclear "whether and to what 
extent" Section 5 legislation may regulate private conduct and rejecting contention that 
Morrison establishes a per se ban on such regulation). 
84. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 3 97 (noting that "[a] strong argument can be made, on 
the basis of the origins of the equal protection clause, that private lynching was among the 
evils that Congress was meant to have power to forbid"); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, 
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 CO LUM. L. REV. 131, 1 62-
63 (1 950) (arguing that the view the Fourteenth Amendment "ha[s] no bearing upon dis­
criminatory acts by private persons . . . .  was so totally foreign to the conceptions of those 
who passed the Amendment that no real assessment of it can be made in terms of recon­
struction attitudes"); Frantz, supra note 80, at 13 57 ("Congress believed it possessed . . .  
power to protect the newly-freed Negro from private aggression . . . .  "); Gressman, supra 
note 3 6, at 1340 (arguing that "[i]t was private action, not state action, that had caused so 
much of the post-war bloodshed and atrocities in the South"). 
8 5. See GOLDMAN, supra note 4 2, at 100, 10 9; Benedict, supra note 3 6, at 71-7 5 (dis­
cussing ways in which both decisions authorize broad federal power to protect individual 
rights); Kennedy, supra note 3 6, at 100 (arguing that Waite Court critics "oversimplif[y] by 
exaggerating the extent to which the Waite Court hobbled federal efforts to protect blacks 
and neglecting the extent to which certain Waite Court rulings extended protection to blacks 
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discrimination in voting in particular, both Reese and Cruikshank sug­
gest that the Waite Court thought Congress enjoys considerably more 
power than it possesses in other realms.86 To be sure, Reese holds that 
the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits race-based discrimination in · 
voting and permits Congress to proscribe only similarly motivated 
acts. This suggests that "appropriate" federal legislation in this realm 
must require proof of racially discriminatory intent.87 When viewed 
through the lens of contemporary doctrine, the implication is that 
Congress may not proscribe facially race-neutral conduct for which 
racial animus is the likely motivation.88 More generally, Reese implies 
that Congress may not proscribe constitutional conduct even where it 
deems such proscriptions necessary to remedy a constitutional viola­
tion.89 
The Waite Court was not, however, committed to this proposition, 
as Cruikshank and Reese themselves indicate. Reese strikes down the 
statutory provisions because the Court understood them to proscribe 
wrongful conduct that denied the vote for reasons wholly unrelated to 
race and accordingly unrelated to conduct violating the Fifteenth 
Amendment.90 The United States' brief in the Supreme Court stated 
in circumstances that would have plausibly allowed for a different outcome"); Maltz, supra 
note 3 6, at 81 (arguing that the Waite Court's voting and jury cases "reflect sympathy for 
major elements of the Republican theory of federal power"); see also CURRIE, supra note 
62, at 40 2 (rejecting as too extreme the critique that the Waite Court undermined Congress's 
enforcement powers and "abandon[ed] blacks to the mercies of Southern hostility"); 
KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 213 (arguing that Reese "implicitly reject[s] the defense's 
narrow interpretation of state action") .  
8 6. See GOLDMAN, supra note 4 2, at 10 6 (noting that " (b]oth decisions agreed that the 
Fifteenth Amendment did protect citizens from voter discrimination based on race . . .  [and 
both] clearly and explicitly confirmed congressional authority to protect that right from dis­
crimination based on race"); WANG , supra note 48, at 13 2 (arguing that Reese and Cruik­
shank preserved the federal government's "power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment" 
and both agreed that "Congress had the power to protect . . .  the right to be exempt from 
voting discrimination on account of race"). 
87. Cf McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 (sug­
gesting that insofar as the statutory provisions in Reese applied "to denials of the right to 
vote on grounds other than race," they "exceeded" Congress's powers under Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment). 
88. Nearly a century later, the Court would reject this suggestion by upholding congres­
sional power to proscribe seemingly race-neutral electoral practices for which Congress sus­
pects racially discriminatory intent is the motivation. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 11 2 
(1 970) ; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1 966); see also CURRIE, supra note 62, at 3 93-
94 (noting that while Reese's conclusion that the congressional enforcement power extends 
only to racially motivated electoral practices "seems obvious from the language and evident 
purpose of the enforcement provision," the principle requires "some qualification to prevent 
evasion"). 
8 9. See Caminker, Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, supra note 83, at 13 62 
(distinguishing permissible means from permissible ends of Section 5 legislation). 
90. See United States v. Reese, 92 U .S. 214, 218- 20 (187 6); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 
4 2, at 24 9 (suggesting that the Court held the statute to be "inappropriate" legislation be­
cause it understood it to target conduct regarding which "there was no design to thwart the 
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment") ; Warren, supra note 59, at 21 9 (stating that 
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that the statute transcended race-based denials of the vote, notwith­
standing evidence that Congress meant for the proscription to block 
only racially motivated conduct.91 The Solicitor General wrote that the 
statutory provisions prohibited "unlawful hindrances . . . upon any 
account and by any person," and accordingly "have a much wider ap­
plication than is needed for the case before us."92 The Court accepted 
this construction and thus did not address whether Congress had 
power to proscribe race-neutral conduct in order to block race-based 
discrimination in voting. 
Reese and Cruikshank moreover decline to resolve whether 
Congress may more easily proscribe private, and thus constitutional, 
conduct pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fifteenth 
Amendment than it may under the Fourteenth. Reese invalidates sec­
tions 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act for failing to require racial motivation, 
stating that "Congress can interfere" in state elections only when a 
State "wrongful[ly] refus[ es] to receive the vote of a qualified elec­
tor .... because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."93 
So too, Cruikshank dismisses indictment counts pertaining to voting 
because the indictment counts alleging interference with the victims' 
voting rights did not assert a racial motivation.94 In so doing, neither 
decision suggests any constitutional infirmity stemming from the 
application of the relevant statutes to purely private conduct in con­
nection with voting.95 
To be sure, this omission may reflect nothing more than that the 
Court had already dispensed with the voting claims on intent grounds 
Reese "did not take from Congress the power to legislative against racially motivated inter­
ferences with the right to vote"). 
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
92. See Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (187 6) (No. 
14 5) ;  see also FAIRMAN, supra note 4 2, at 237 (arguing that the government's brief in Reese 
"was working in effect against the possibility that the Court might read [the statute] more 
narrowly and, so construed, sustain it") ; GOLDMAN, supra note 4 2, at 7 9. 
93. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218. 
94. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 54 2, 556 (187 5) (noting that "[w]e may sus­
pect that race was the cause of the hostility ; but it is not so averred"). 
95. See BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 65, 68 ; Benedict, supra note 3 6, at 7 2; Maltz, supra 
note 3 6, at 7 9. But see HYMAN & W!ECEK, supra note 3 6, at 48 9 (reading Reese and Cruik­
shank as placing the Court "well on a state-action-only path of interpretation") ; 
MCPHERSON, supra note 54, at 638 (reading Reese and Cruikshank as "narrow[ing] the 
scope of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments" and establishing that the Amendments 
"empowered Congress to legislate only against discrimination by states") ; TUNNELL, supra 
note 48, at 1 93 (reading Cruikshank to hold that "because a private army and not the State 
of Louisiana committed the massacre, the federal government was powerless to act") ; 
Schmidt, supra note 73, at 840 n.14 (arguing that Cruikshank rested on state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and had clear implications for federal power to protect black voters 
from private violence under the Fifteenth, given that it too was directed at the States). 
2358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2341 
and thus was not required to address state action as well.96 It certainly 
falls short of affirmatively establishing federal power to proscribe 
private conduct.97 Still, the Court's refusal to pass on the question of 
private action suggests a receptivity to congressional power in this 
realm incompatible with steadfast opposition to Reconstruction. The 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments both proscribe state action.98 
But in his circuit court decision in Cruikshank,99 Justice Bradley 
expressly distinguished the two Amendments on state action 
grounds.100 The lower court in Reese split on whether Congress could 
punish private individuals who interfered with voting rights secured by 
the Fifteenth Amendment.101 Counsel for the defendants in both Reese 
and Cruikshank challenged congressional power to reach private 
action under the Fifteenth Amendment.102 And yet, in both cases, the 
Court opted to resolve the voting claims on intent grounds, even 
96. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 62, at 3 95- 96 n.182 (rejecting reading Reese and Cruik­
shank to embrace congressional power to reach private conduct under the Fifteenth 
Amendment because it "seems to confuse deciding with refusing to decide"); Sarah B. Law­
sky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 10 9 YALE 
L.J. 783, 80 5-0 6 n.142 (2000) (stating that "(t]o conclude that there is no state action re­
quirement for the Fifteenth Amendment because the Court chose different grounds on 
which to invalidate the statutes in question seems an unwarranted leap - an extraordinarily 
strong version of expressio unius est exclusio alterius"). 
97. See JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 103 (1 90 9) (noting that Cruikshank "neither affirmed nor denied 
Bradley's opinion that the Amendment inhibits the acts of private individuals"). But see 
BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 68 (stating that "[d]icta in Cruikshank and Reese had upheld 
the power of Congress to reach racially motivated violations of voting rights - whether pri­
vately or o f icial done - in state and local elections"); Benedict, supra note 3 6, at 72 (argu­
ing that Reese and Cruikshank "endorsed Bradley's expansive view of congressional author­
ity to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against individual infringements of the rights to 
vote . . .  [and] agree[d] that Congress could punish private offenses against citizens' voting 
rights so long as they were motivated by race or previous condition of servitude"); see also 
Maltz, supra note 3 6, at 8 5  (finding support in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), for 
this same proposition). For evidence that at least some of the Justices understood Congress 
to possess this power, see United States v. Butler, 2 5  F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. S.C. 1877) (No. 
14,700) (opinion of Waite, C.J.) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 2 5  F. Cas. 707, 712-13 (C.C.D. 
La. 1874) (No. 14,8 97) (opinion of Bradley, J.). 
98. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . .  deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 
("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."). 
99. Cruikshank, 2 5  F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874). 
100. Id. at 712-13 (stating that, in contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth 
Amendment created "a positive right" and conferred on Congress "the power to secure that 
right not only as against the unfriendly operation o f  state laws, but against outrage, violence, 
and combinations on the part o f  individuals, irrespective of the state laws"). 
For a discussion o f  Justice Bradley's opinion, see GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 55- 57; 
KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 1 82-83; WANG, supra note 48, at 12 6-27; Benedict, supra 
note 3 6, at 71-74; Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley's Civil Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70 
TUL. L. REV. 1 97 9, 1 992- 95 (1 996). 
101. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 202. 
102. See id. 
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though Cruikshank relied on state action to dismiss the Fourteenth 
Amendment counts.103 Both cases squarely presented the Court with 
the question whether Congress can reach private action under the 
Fifteenth Amendment and in both cases the Court declined to resolve 
it.104 
Reese's analysis of section 3 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 also 
suggests that the Waite Court thought that Congress enjoys notably 
broad power to remedy Fifteenth Amendment violations. Section 3 
provided that a citizen's offer to perform a state-mandated prerequi­
site to voting shall "be deemed and held as a performance in law of 
such act" insofar as the offer "fail[s] to be carried into execution by 
reason of the wrongful act or omission aforesaid" of the person 
charged with giving it effect.105 As Reese explains, the provision 
effected a dramatic change in state electoral practice. Not only had 
Congress prescribed electoral rules "not provided by the laws of the 
States," but the Act "substitutes, under certain circumstances, 
performance wrongfully prevented for performance itself." 106 In the 
circumstances described, state-voting inspectors were required to treat 
the citizen's submission of attempted compliance "as the equivalent of 
the specified requirement." 107 In other words, Congress had assumed 
for itself the institutional role of state-election inspector, implement­
ing by force of law the rules of decision it had prescribed for state elec­
tions and binding other state actors to honor the results. 
Reese, of course, strikes down this statutory provision as unconsti­
tutional. But it does so because the Court perceived a lack of clarity as 
to what the provision proscribed and not because the remedy 
prescribed was deemed to intrude too greatly into state sovereignty. 
Reading the statute to apply to wrongful refusals not motivated by 
race, or at a minimum to be vague on this point,108 Reese states that a 
change in practice as "radical" as the one section 3 attempted "should 
be explicit in its terms . . . .  The law ought not be in such a condition 
that the elector may act upon one idea of its meaning, and the inspec-
103. United States v. Cruikshank, 9 2  U.S. 54 2, 554- 55 (1876). 
104. The Court a ffirmatively held that Congress lacked the power to reach private ac­
tion under the Fi fteenth Amendment in James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 1 27 (1903). Cf Voting 
Rights Act § l l (b), 4 2  U.S.C. § 1973(i)(b) ( 2000) (barring any person "whether acting under 
color o f  law or otherwise" from intimidating actual or prospective voters); Nipper v. Smith, 
39 F.3d 1494, 1 549 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
constitutionality o f §  ll(b) is "questionable"); United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219 
(D.C. La. 1966) (invalidating application o f §  l l(b) to landlords who evicted black tenants 
who had registered to vote). 
10 5. Act o f  May 31,  1870, ch. 1 14, §§ 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36, 37 
(1894). 
106. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 219 (1876). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 219- 20. 
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tor upon another."109 Reese thus asserts that the statute provided 
inspectors and voters alike insufficient guidance regarding the scope of 
its proscription. Had the statute more explicitly limited the triggering 
state action to racially motivated conduct, Reese implies that Congress 
could constitutionally have assumed the institutional role set forth in 
section 3, that is, Congress could "substitute[] . . .  performance wrong­
fully prevented for performance itself." 1 10 
Reese does not hold that Congress may assume this role any more ' 
than Reese and Cruikshank establish definitively that Congress can' 
broadly reach private action when acting to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment's proscription on race-based discrimination in voting. 
Instead, both decisions set forth narrow legal holdings that carefully 
leave open the possibility that Congress possesses such broad and 
intrusive power. The Court's willingness to leave this possibility open 
is noteworthy, particularly given the lack of restraint displayed else­
where in the same opinions. The Court's refusal to foreclose these op­
portunities for congressional action temper the charge that Reese and 
Cruikshank evince the Court's determination to end Reconstruction 
and "protect[] white supremacy."1 1 1  
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CONGRESS'S ENFORCEMENT 
POWERS 
Like those of the Waite Court, decisions of the Rehnquist Court 
circumscribe Congress's authority to frame antidiscrimination 
measures pursuant to the Reconstruction-era Amendments. They 
nevertheless accord Congress significant deference when it acts to 
address racial discrimination in voting. This Part identifies this defer­
ence in City of Boerne v. Flores112 and its progeny.1 1 3  The Boerne deci­
sions significantly limit Congress's enforcement powers,1 14 but never­
theless preserve seemingly contrary precedent upholding provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") against constitutional challenge. This 
Part then argues that this deference may be reconciled with the seem-
10 9. Id. at 21 9; cf KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48. 
1 10. Reese, 92 U.S. at 21 9. But see Schmidt, supra note 73, at 840 n.1 2 (arguing that this 
language from Reese "reveal[s) a general hostility to federal intervention in state elec­
tions."). 
1 1 1 .  KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 4 9- 50 ;  see also supra note 54. 
1 1 2. 521 U.S. 507 (1 997). 
113. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 1 23 S. Ct. 1 97 2  ( 2003) ; Bd. of Trs. of 
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 3 56 ( 2001) ; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
( 2000) ; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 ( 2000) ; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Pre­
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1 999) ;  Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1 999). 
1 14. Hibbs is the exception. See supra note 1 2. 
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ing antipathy several recent voting-rights decisions display toward the 
VRA and Congress. 
A. The Boerne Decisions and the VRA Precedent 
City of Boerne v. Flores announced the now familiar requirement 
that congressional legislation enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments 
must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."1 15 In four 
years, six federal statutes fell under this standard, notwithstanding the 
nominally "wide latitude"1 16 the Court maintains Congress enjoys in 
framing enforcement legislation.117 Applying rigorous review, the Court 
has deemed linkages between statutory proscriptions and constitutional 
injuries too attenuated, statutory remedies too broad, and underlying 
congressional findings too skimpy to render various statutory provisions 
valid exercises of Congress's enforcement power. 
Elements of the Boerne decisions offer support for the view that 
the Rehnquist Court is hostile to the Second Reconstruction and that 
it engages in "conservative activism" to dismantle it.1 18 Nearly all of 
11 5. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
1 1 6. Id. 
117. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 3 56 ( 2001) (invalidating abroga­
tion of state immunity in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 ( 2000) (invalidating § 13 981 of VA WA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re­
gents, 528 U.S. 62 ( 2000) (invalidating attempted abrogation of state immunity in the 
ADEA); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1 999) (invalidating attempted abrogation of state immunity in the Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627 (1 999) (invalidating abrogation of state immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1 997) (invalidating the Relig­
ious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") as applied to state and local action). 
1 18. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98- 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part) (stating that "[t]he kind of judicial activism manifested" in various federalism cases 
including the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions "represents such a radical 
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the oppor­
tunity arises"); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 10 54; Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. 
Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1- 2, 40 ( 2000) (describing feder­
alism decisions as "signal[ing] a newly activist role for the courts in patrolling the boundaries 
of federal authority" and the Boerne doctrine, as applied in Kimel, as embodying a "radical 
restriction on congressional power to determine its own agenda in matters pertaining to in­
dividual rights"); Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional 
Expansion of Rights, supra note 4, at 60 2 (describing Boerne as displaying "conservative ju­
dicial activism"); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 
87 ( 2001) (arguing that decisions like Kimel and Morrison embody "judicial activism in 
which disrespect for Congress is a fundamental element"); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme 
Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 3 9-40 ( 2000) (drawing parallels between 
Boerne and Lochner v. New York, 1 98 U.S. 4 5  (1 90 5)); Cass Sunstein, A Hand in the Matter, 
LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 27- 28 (suggesting that in striking down portions of the 
ADA, ADEA, and VAWA, "[t]he Rehnquist Court has been engaged in right-wing judicial 
activism") .  But see Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE 
L. REV. 931 ,  93 2 ( 2001) (arguing that Boerne "is far from being wildly activist"). 
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these decisions diminish the scope of federal regulation by invalidating 
federal statutes and circumscribing congressional power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne eliminated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act's ("RFRA") broad application to virtually all types of 
state and local governmental decisions.1 19 Florida Prepaid, College 
Savings Bank, Kimel, and Garrett shield states from potential financial 
liability and the dignitary affront said to accompany the abrogation of 
state immunity that Congress had attempted.120 Morrison ensured 
exclusivity of state power in a realm in which VA WA sought to 
provide a supplemental federal remedy.121 Boerne, Kimel, Morrison, 
and Garrett all strike down statutes that may aptly be deemed antidis­
crimination or civil-rights measures of the type thought to constitute 
the core of the Second Reconstruction.122 And while Hibbs seems to 
break this trend by upholding the Family Medical Leave Act, it does 
so without casting doubt on the doctrinal validity of the preceding 
Boerne cases.123 
As a group, the Boerne cases announce new principles defining 
congressional power that appear inconsistent with precedent and 
historical understandings of the scope of that power. 124 Boerne holds 
that Congress lacks authority to engage in independent constitutional 
interpretation and that its Section 5 power is limited to remedying 
11 9. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and 
Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1 997 SUP. Cr. REV. 7 9, 10 5-0 6 (describing 
RFRA's breadth of application); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 9-10 (1 998} (same). 
1 20. Cf. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1 999 
SUP. Cr. REV. l, 52- 56 [hereinafter Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Fed­
eralism] (criticizing the view that state dignitary interests justify sovereign immunity, and 
stating that "[i)t is simply an extraordinary statement, in our political tradition, to suggest 
that any governmental entity has a 'dignity' intrinsically superior to that of the individual. 
There are no kings here."). 
1 21 .  See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States 
v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 13 5, 13 6, 14 9 ( 2000) (stating that VAWA "duplicated no 
state law in theory, design, or remedy," that it was a law "with federalism-friendly concur­
rent jurisdiction," and that it "provided merely a supplementary civil option while leaving 
state criminal remedies in place"). 
1 22. Id. at 13 5; Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 48 6- 50 2, 513- 22. 
1 23. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 1 23 S. Ct. 1 97 2, 1 977-78, 1 981-83 
( 2003); supra note 1 2; infra note 13 5. 
1 24. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming of a Co­
ordinate Branch: The Supreme Court in Garrett, 4 GREEN BAG ( 2d ser.) 3 51 ,  3 54- 55 ( 2001) 
(describing the "new-fangled congruence and proportionality test" set forth in the Boerne 
decisions and accusing the Court of "making up new rules that Congress could not reasona­
bly have anticipated"}; Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a 
Social Movement Perspective, 1 50 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 34 9 ( 2001) (noting that "Boerne and 
its progeny break with the doctrinal frameworks - and institutional understandings -
through which the Court has defined Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation since 
the beginning of the second Reconstruction"). 
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violations of constitutional rights as defined by the Court.125 This 
holding expressly rejects Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion that 
Congress may "rachet up" constitutional protections as construed by 
the Court,126 and historical evidence indicating that the Framers of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments intended for Congress to have 
this authority.127 
As the measure of the "appropriateness" of remedial legislation, 
moreover, the congruence-and-proportionality test represents a new 
and substantial hurdle that renders congressional action in this realm 
inherently suspect, much in the way that use of a racial classification 
triggers strict scrutiny.128 The Court has examined the disputed statutes 
125. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) ("Any suggestion that Congress 
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported 
by our case law."). 
126. Id. at 527-28 (noting language in Morgan that "could be interpreted as acknowl­
edging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment" but stating that "[t]his is not a necessary interpretation, how­
ever, or even the best one"); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966); 
Shane, supra note 4, at 207 n.37 (arguing that Morgan was no longer good precedent when 
Boerne was decided); Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, supra 
note 120, at 13-14. 
127. See, e.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextualism, 1 12 HARV. L. REV. 747, 822-23 & 
n.292 (1999) (arguing that the Framers intended for Congress to exercise broad enforcement 
powers under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and that this power was not lim­
ited to remedial legislation); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 1 18 (2000) (arguing that 
the "Reconstruction Republicans aimed to give Congress broad power to declare and define 
the fundamental rights - the privileges and immunities - of American citizens above and 
beyond the floor set by courts"); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec­
tion 5 Powers, supra note 20, at 1 132 (characterizing as plausible the view that "Section 5 is 
best understood as contemplating some participation by Congress in the definition of consti­
tutional norms"); Laycock, supra note 1 18, at 39 & n.55; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions 
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 
(1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions and lnterpretation](suggesting that Boerne con­
flicts with the Framers' intent); see also Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 
5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 133 (1999) (arguing that Boerne's historical analysis "does not hold up 
under scrutiny" and that the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history "do[es] not pro­
vide any support for a narrowing of Congress's power to enforce" the Amendment). But see 
Hamilton, supra note 1 18, at 934-35 (arguing that "[t]he constitutional structure feature that 
is enforced in the federalism cases is not inherently at odds with the Fourteenth Amend­
ment"). 
128. See, e.g. , 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 
(3d ed. 2000); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra 
note 20, at 1147 (arguing that Boerne's congruence-and-proportionality test "clearly devi­
ated from the Court's longstanding articulation and application of the more deferential 
McCulloch means-ends standard"); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitu­
tional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. Cr. REV. 61, 91 (noting that "congruence and proportionality 
is a demanding standard"); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 682 (1998) (stating that Boerne establishes a "more rigorous" 
test for determining whether legislation is appropriate under Section 5); McConnell, Institu­
tions and Interpretation, supra note 127, at 166 (noting congruence and proportionality ele­
vates level of scrutiny applied to Section 5 legislation); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 477 
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with considerable rigor and has demanded extensive findings of 
underlying unconstitutional conduct to validate congressional 
enforcement legislation.129 
The Boerne decisions establish that Congress cannot rely on either 
general assertions or isolated examples of unconstitutional conduct, 130 
but instead must document a widespread pattern of such conduct by 
entities of the precise sort being subject to suit.131 Boerne, Florida 
Prepaid, College Savings Bank, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett each 
reject as inadequate the findings underlying the disputed statutes on 
the grounds that Congress documented too few instances of unconsti­
tutional conduct.1 32 Even the sizable record Congress amassed 
regarding the inadequacy of state attempts to combat gender­
motivated violence proved insufficient to save VA WA because 
(equating congruence and proportionality with narrow tailoring required by strict-scrutiny 
analysis). 
129. See infra notes 130-135. 
130. See, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001) 
(dismissing "unexamined, anecdotal accounts of 'adverse, disparate treatment by state offi­
cials,' " when found outside the formal legislative findings); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000) (rejecting as insufficient "assorted sentences . . .  cobble[d] together 
from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates" as either general unsub­
stantiated assertions or isolated anecdotal examples). While the Court has not wholly re­
jected anecdotal evidence suggesting unconstitutional conduct, it has treated such examples 
with considerable skepticism and indicated its preference for examples of adjudicated consti­
tutional violations. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting 
absence of "confirming judicial documentation" in the form of court decisions addressing 
unconstitutional discrimination by States against people with disabilities). 
131. See, e.g. , Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (finding that Congress failed "to uncover any signifi­
cant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination," and that it lacked "evidence of widespread 
and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States"); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (concluding that "Congress 
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitu­
tional violations"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (noting absence of 
evidence documenting "some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this coun­
try"); id. at 526 (noting absence of a "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional 
rights"). 
132. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (finding that the lengthy legislative record docu­
menting employment discrimination against the disabled included few instances of invidious 
state activities and noting that even if six specific record examples involving contemporary 
state action amounted to unconstitutional discrimination, they "fall far short of even sug­
gesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be 
based"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (holding record inadequate for failing to identify viola­
tions in every State); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (finding legislative findings underlying the abro­
gation of state immunity in the ADEA so wanting as to render Congress' extension of the 
Act to the States "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem"); Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 645-46 ("Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response 
to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the Con­
stitution."); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (noting that documented instances of state­
sponsored religious bigotry dated back forty years or more, while more recent examples in­
volved benignly motivated laws of general applicability that placed only "incidental bur­
dens" on religion and reflected neither "animus [n]or hostility to burdened religious prac­
tices"). 
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Congress had not compiled findings of unconstitutional conduct in 
every State.133 Garrett subsequently · cited neither a state-by-state 
requirement nor Morrison at all, but likewise dismissed a lengthy rec­
ord of legislative findings for failure to identify unconstitutional con­
duct expressly by States.134 And while Hibbs again seems to depart 
from this trend by deeming the congressional record underlying the 
FMLA adequate, the decision is careful to emphasize "the extent and 
specificity" of unconstitutional state conduct found in that record and 
to affirm the continuing validity of Boerne's demanding "means-ends" 
approach.135 
This rigorous approach contrasts significantly with that taken by 
the Court in a quartet136 of earlier decisions upholding provisions of 
the VRA challenged as enactments exceeding Congress's enforcement 
power. South Carolina v. Katzenbach137 upholds congressional power to 
suspend literacy tests and other voting qualifications in jurisdictions that 
historically engaged in voting discrimination. It also affirms Congress's 
power to block such jurisdictions from changing their electoral practices 
133. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (stating "that the problem of discrimination against the 
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States"); Post & 
Siegel, supra note 5, at 478. 
134. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (finding that even if a 
state report established unconstitutional age discrimination by that State, it was not suffi­
cient to establish that unconstitutional age discrimination " 'had become a problem of na­
tional import.' " (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641)). 
Garrett moreover suggests that supportive evidence found in documents outside the 
formal legislative record should be disregarded. The opinion disregards "a host of incidents" 
that purported to represent unconstitutional state discrimination in employment based on 
disability because those incidents consisted "not of legislative findings, but of unexamined, 
anecdotal accounts" that did not necessarily rise to constitutional dimension and that were 
submitted "not directly" to Congress but instead to a task force that did not specifically ad­
dress state discrimination in employment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71 .  
135. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981-82 & n.11. To be sure, Hibbs acknowledges that the rec­
ord underlying the FMLA was not markedly more comprehensive than the records Garrett 
and Kimel deemed inadequate. Id. at 1981. Hibbs nevertheless insists that Congress may 
more easily demonstrate a pattern of state constitutional violations when it targets gender­
based distinctions than when it addresses nonsuspect classifications. The reason, Hibbs 
states, is that the heightened judicial scrutiny triggered by gender discrimination makes de­
fending gender-based distinctions more difficult. Id. at 1982; supra note 12. Hibbs leaves un­
answered, however, why this heightened scrutiny did not establish the sufficiency of the far­
more-extensive record underlying VA WA in United States v. Morrison. See 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (rejecting congressional power to subject private parties to liability under VA WA); 
see also Coyle, supra note 12 (noting tensions between Hibbs and Morrison). And to the ex­
tent that the Court does accord Congress greater deference in the realm of gender discrimi­
nation, Hibbs makes clear that it will continue to require specific and extensive supporting 
congressional findings. Thus while Hibbs is certainly more deferential to legislative judg­
ments than was Kimel or Garrett, the decision hardly accords Congress the tremendous lee­
way displayed in the earlier VRA cases. See infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
1.36. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two 
Section Twos and Two Section Fives] (describing voting-rights precedent cited in Boerne as 
the "Voting Rights quartet"). 
137. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
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absent prior federal preclearance certifying that the proposed changes 
were discriminatory neither in purpose nor in effect.138 Katzenbach v. 
Morgan affirms Congress's authority to bar English literacy as a prereq­
uisite to voting for graduates of designated non-English-language 
schools.139 Oregon v. Mitche/1140 upholds congressional power to suspend 
the use of the literacy tests nationwide for a five-year period. City of 
Rome v. United States141 affirms the constitutionality of the VRA's 
preclearance process, as extended in 1975, and expressly approves 
congressional power to ban within that process practices that are 
discriminatory in effect, even if evidence of underlying discriminatory 
intent is absent.142 Read together, these decisions embrace expansive 
federal authority to intrude deeply into state sovereign processes, to 
prohibit conduct the Constitution permits,143 and to promote the race­
conscious policies that inhere in the VRA.144 They support the creation 
and maintenance of the large federal bureaucracy needed to implement 
the VRA's provisions.145 
138. For a description of the preclearance process under § 5 of the VRA, see infra notes 
169-171 and accompanying text. 
139. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); infra notes 147-153 and accompa­
nying text (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan). Congress intended for the provision to over­
ride New York's English literacy requirements, which functioned to disenfranchise thou­
sands of the State's Puerto Rican residents. See STONE ET AL. , supra note 63, at 222. 
140. 400 U.S. 1 12 (1970). 
141. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
142. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173. 
143. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the 
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (noting that the VRA "demands the intimate 
involvement of the courts in state and local electoral systems, even to the extent of setting 
aside longstanding political arrangements"). 
144. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 1179, 1205 (2001) [hereinafter Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist 
Court] (noting that compliance with a ban on racially discriminatory effects require those 
governed by it to consider race expressly or risk violating the proscription); Daniel Hays 
Lowenstein, You Don 't Have to be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 779, 825 (1998) (noting that under both § 2 and § 5 of the VRA "race is a 
privileged criterion" and that " [t]he legislature and everyone who participates in the process 
must begin with race"); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehen­
sive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 107 (2000) 
(describing the Court's "implicit recognition that race-based districting to avoid retrogres­
sion may well be required to satisfy the effect prong of section 5 preclearance scrutiny"); 
Lisa Erickson, Comment, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Criticism of the Justice De­
partment in Miller v. Johnson, 65 MISS. L.J. 409, 421 (1995) (noting that § 5 
requires covered jurisdictions to "consider race in implementing new voting practices in 
order to achieve equal opportunity in voting rights"). 
145. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard Grofrnan & Chandler Davidson 
eds., 1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 
N.C. L. REV. 189, 191 (1983). 
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Most notably, they accord considerable deference to congressional 
judgments regarding the necessity of the measures.146 Katzenbach v. 
Morgan,147 for example, upheld as appropriate enforcement legislation 
section 4(e) of the VRA of 1965. The statute blocked New York from 
administering an English literacy requirement that functioned to disen­
franchise large segments of New York City's Puerto Rican community.148 
Morgan states that Congress could have concluded both that New 
York's requirement itself constituted "invidious discrimination in estab­
lishing voter qualifications,"149 and that it fostered "discrimination in 
governmental services."150 Morgan did not require specific congressional 
findings supporting these conclusions, nor did it even mandate that 
Congress had in fact reached such conclusions about section 4(e)'s 
necessity. Instead, the Court deemed it sufficient that Congress "might 
well have questioned" the facially neutral justifications the State 
proffered for its law,151 and that the Court could "perceive a basis upon 
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."152 Morgan states: 
"It is not for us to review the congressional resolution" of the factors that 
informed that judgment.153 
This deference, which several of the opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell 
echo,154 and Boerne appears to condone,155 contrasts noticeably with 
146. See, e.g. , Nowak, supra note 1, at 1 110 (noting that these decisions "granted great 
deference to Congress in controlling actions of state governments and private persons re­
lated to racial discrimination in voting"). 
147. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
148. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2000)). 
149. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654. 
150. Id. at 653. 
151. Id. at 654-55. 
152. Id. at 653. 
153. Id. 
154. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12, 132 (1970) (opinion o fBlack, J.) (stating that Con­
gress "could have found" that literacy tests had racially disparate effects and "could have con­
cluded" that "condition[ing]" the vote on literacy violates the Equal Protection Clause); id at 
147 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (stating that Congress "need not make 
findings as to the incidence of literacy," and that the legislative history revealed that Congress 
was "influenced" by a host of relevant factors); id. at 216 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, concur­
ring in part) (finding the issue "not free from difficulty," and concluding that "[d]espite lack of 
evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or effect, Congress could have de­
termined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly 
lend themselves to discriminatory application"); id. at 216 n.94 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, 
concurring in part) (stating that legislative history from the 1965 Act sufficed to justify the 1970 
ban on literacy tests and noting that "[w]hether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into 
the extent and effects of discrimination, either as a condition precedent or as a condition subse­
quent to suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make"); id. (Harlan, J., dis­
senting in part, concurring in part) (noting that "[w]hile a less sweeping approach in this delicate 
area might well have been appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of 
reasonable."); id. at 233 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (stating that 
"[c]ongressional power to remedy the evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination 
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the increasingly rigorous review employed in the Boerne cases.156 And 
yet, the Boerne cases do not purport to overrule the VRA precedent. . 
Indeed, they self-consciously leave this precedent largely intact.157 
Boerne cites each of the provisions upheld in the VRA quartet from 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome as permissible 
enforcement legislation, despite both "the burden those measures placed 
on the States" and their proscription of constitutional conduct.158 
Boerne's progeny, with perhaps somewhat Jess vigor, likewise invoke the 
earlier VRA provisions as examples of permissible congressional action, 
and cite the decisions upholding them as so establishing.159 
does not end when the subject of that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in 
which the injury occurred"). 
155. City of Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507, 528 (1997) (stating that "[b]oth rationales for 
upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York and Congress' reason­
able attempt to combat it"); see also infra Part Ill. 
156. See, e.g. , William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the , 
Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391, 417 (1998) (stating 
that Boerne "ignores the Morgan limitation that the Court 'be able to perceive' a basis for 
Congress's judgment"); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 
Powers, supra note 20, at 1 143 (arguing that Boerne "departed sharply from the longstanding 
tradition of deferential means-ends scrutiny"); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126 
(contrasting approach of Court in Boerne with its approach in City of Rome); Karlan, Two 
Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 726 (discussing implications of 
Boerne for §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 478-79 
(noting tension between United States v. Morrison and Oregon v. Mitchell); Bernard 
Schwartz, A Presidential Strikeottt, Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and Stealth Court, 33 
TULSA L.J. 77, 84 (1997) (arguing that the Boerne rationale "is essentially inconsistent with 
that of Morgan . . .  and "without acknowledging it, Boerne adopts the approach urged by 
Justice Harlan in his Morgan dissent"); John Matthew Guard, Comment, "Impotent Figure­
heads"? State Sovereignty, Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights After Lopez v. Monterey County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329 
(1999) [hereinafter Guard, Impotent Figureheads]; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
1 18, at 95-96 (arguing that Boerne's distinction between remedial- and rights-defining en­
actments by Congress was a self-conscious echo of Harlan's dissenting views in Morgan and 
Mitchell). But cf John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets 
Among the Rubble, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 348 (1998/99) (stating that Boerne's preser­
vation of the earlier VRA cases "allow[s] Congress to strike preemptively against proven 
forms of discrimination"). 
1 57. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001)  (contrasting 
abrogation of immunity in ADA with the VRA provisions upheld in Sottth Carolina v. 
Katzenbach); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (contrasting VA WA 
with statutory provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. 
Morgan); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-89 (2000) (discussing South Caro­
lina v. Katzenbach); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 639 & n.5 (1 999) (citing, as a point of contrast, the VRA quartet); Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 5 18 (citing VRA quartet as examples of permissible enforcement legislation). The notable. 
exception is Boerne's rejection of Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion that Congress may ex­
pand the rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997). 
158. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 521 U.S. at 518. 
159. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982 (citing the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach as examples of permissible congressional measures to address a serious prob­
lem); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (stating that the ADA's "constitutional shortcomings are ap­
parent" when compared with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach);  
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The Court has nevertheless been unable to distinguish convinc­
ingly the statutory regimes the VRA decisions upheld from those 
struck down under the Boerne doctrine. Geographic restrictions, 160 
statutorily mandated expiration dates,161 and documented examples of 
flagrant and pervasive underlying unconstitutional conduct162 distin­
guish some, but not all, of the provisions preserved. And Boerne itself 
insists that valid Section 5 legislation does not require "termination 
dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates."163 None of 
these elements, moreover, explains the markedly different degrees of 
deference employed by the Court in the earlier VRA cases, on the one 
hand, and the Boerne cases, on the other.164 In short, the Boerne cases 
appear to be doctrinally irreconcilable with the earlier VRA precedent 
they purport to preserve.165 
To be sure, in Boerne and its progeny, the Court's preservation of 
the cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome 
may signify nothing more than its unwillingness to overrule these 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (describing VAWA as "unlike" the remedies upheid in Katzen­
bach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach);  Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (contrasting con­
gressional record supporting ADEA's abrogation of state immunity with that underlying the 
VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 639 
n.5 (invoking Boerne's discussion of the VRA quartet to distinguish the statutory provision 
in dispute). 
160. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding § 5 of the 
VRA, as extended in 1975). 
161. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-81 (upholding extension of § 5, as extended for 
seven years); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (upholding 
nationwide five-year suspension of literacy tests); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 
337 (upholding § 4(a) of the VRA, imposing a five-year ban on literacy tests in covered ju­
risdictions, and the § 5 preclearance process, as limited by the five-year ban). Congress sub­
sequently made the nationwide ban on literacy tests permanent. See Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 201, 89 Stat. 400, 400 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1973aa (2000)). 
162. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 132 (opinion of Black, J.) (noting that " [i)n enacting the liter­
acy test ban . . .  Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy 
tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. at 308-29 (noting extensive congressional findings of discriminatory conduct supporting 
imposition of preclearance requirement on covered jurisdictions). But compare Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 626 (rejecting as inadequate extensive congressional findings of state misconduct 
in criminal justice administration where findings did not document misconduct in every 
State), with Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(upholding nationwide ban on literacy tests despite absence of state-by-state findings), and 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47 (upholding nationwide prohibition on English lit­
eracy tests despite absence of specific findings supporting unconstitutional use of such tests). 
See generally Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, 
and the Future of Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. Cr. REV. 109, 156 (noting tension be­
tween Morrison and Mitchell); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 478-79 (same). 
163. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997). 
164. See sources cited supra notes 146 and 156 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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older, historically resonant decisions.166 And yet, the Court's nearly 
unanimous post-Boerne affirmation of the constitutionality of a broad 
construction of section 5 of the VRA compels a more broad under­
standing of the Court's preservation of these prior decisions. At issue 
in Lopez v. Monterey County167 was whether a jurisdiction subject to 
section 5 of the VRA must seek and obtain preclearance prior to 
implementing nondiscretionary electoral changes.168 Monterey County 
is a covered jurisdiction under the VRA,169 meaning that it may not 
enact or seek to administer electoral rules unless it receives federal 
judicial or administrative preclearance.170 It must demonstrate, either 
to the Attorney General or to the federal district court in Washington, 
D.C., that a proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color" or membership in a language-minority group.171 The 
dispute in Lopez arose because Monterey County had not obtained 
preclearance prior to implementing changes to its system for electing 
judges. 
Lopez holds that section 5 of the VRA requires preclearance of 
the changes, even if state law mandated them and the County exer­
cised no discretion in implementing them. Justice O'Connor's majority 
opinion holds that nondiscretionary conduct by a covered jurisdiction 
must be precleared because it may produce a racially discriminatory 
effect.172 Nondiscretionary conduct, however, necessarily lacks the 
discriminatory motivation needed to violate the Constitution.173 Thus a 
166. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After 
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan, 
Easing the Spring] (describing the VRA as the "crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction" 
and suggesting that the Court "has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to dismantle [it]"). 
167. 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
168. See generally Katz, Federalism, Prec/earance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 
144, at 1202-03 (discussing relationship of Boerne and Lopez). 
169. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 271 (1999) (interpreting the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-1 10, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), (c), 1973c (2000)). A jurisdiction was "covered" if, on the date the 
VRA became effective, it employed as a prerequisite to voting devices such as a literacy, 
understanding, subject-matter, or moral-character test, and less than fifty percent of the 
voting-age population was registered or actually voted in the presidential election of 1964. 
See § 4(b), (c), 79 Stat. at 438-39 (defining which jurisdictions were covered). As Congress 
extended § 5 in 1970, 1975, and 1982, dates subsequent to 1964 were selected for compara­
tive measurements. 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
171. Voting Rights Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 402 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973d, 1973k (2000)). Covered jurisdictions may 
seek preclearance either from the Attorney General or from the district court in D.C. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
172. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283. 
173. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) 
(holding that "action by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
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proscription against such conduct, even where discriminatory in effect, 
seemingly lacks any linkage to unconstitutional action. Under Boerne 
and its progeny, such a proscription would appear to be beyond 
Congress's enforcement powers. 174 To be sure, the prior bad acts that 
trigger the coverage designation under section 5 suggest a linkage 
between discriminatory effects and invidious intent.175 Section 5 elimi­
nates the presumption of validity that typically attaches to govern 
mental decisionmaking and shifts "the burden of inertia" to covered 
jurisdictions to justify the legality of their conduct.176 Within this 
framework, invidious intent may be assumed to underlie discretionary 
conduct that produces a racially discriminatory effect. And yet, that 
assumption is not plausible where the conduct in question is nondis­
cretionary. 
The Court in Lopez dismisses this concern. Justice O'Connor 
states simply "that Congress has the constitutional authority to desig­
nate covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give rise 
to a discriminatory effect in those jurisdictions."177 Nondiscretionary 
changes can have such an effect, and thus Congress may require cov­
ered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance of them. " [T]he Voting 
Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty," she 
concludes. "The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion . . .  and 
our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to the 
burdens that the Act imposes."178 In other words, this process may be 
intrusive,179 but it falls well within Congress's enforcement powers to 
mandate. The section 5 preclearance process infringes on state sover­
eignty and Lopez affirms that this infringement is constitutionally 
permissible.180 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purp
.
ose"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239-41 (1976) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment's intentionality requirement). 
174. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
175. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 294-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing this justification 
for § 5 of the VRA). 
176. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (noting that Congress passed § 5 
in response to the practice of some jurisdictions of passing new discriminatory voting laws as 
soon as the old ones had been struck down, and accordingly "to shift the advantage of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim" by "freezing election procedures in 
the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory"). 
177. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283. 
178. Id. at 284-85. 
179. See also Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 790 (describing preclearance process as "an 
unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the states."). 
180. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284. Lopez, in fact, references not just § 5 but the Voting Rights 
Act in its entirety. Id. 
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The Court had previously upheld congressional authority to enact 
section 5.181 It had not addressed, however, the constitutionality of the 
statute as extended in 1982 or its validity under the Boerne frame­
work.182 These latter developments had significantly called into ques­
tion the validity of section S's application to nondiscretionary conduct, 
and, more broadly, the validity of the preclearance process itself. And 
yet, Lopez blithely dispenses with them. Justice O'Connor cites 
Boerne but once, and then for the proposition that Congress's 
enforcement power includes the power to prohibit constitutional 
conduct and intrude deeply into state sovereign process.183 Lopez 
ignores the factors that have emerged as central to Boerne's congru­
ence-and-proportionality inquiry, making no mention, for example, of 
the congressional findings underlying the 1982 extension of section 5.184 
Instead, Justice O'Connor affirms the validity of section 5 based on 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome, both of which upheld 
earlier versions of section 5 based on distinct legislative findings and 
historical circumstances.185 
Remarkably, Justice O'Connor's opinion is joined not only by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom dissented in 
l8l. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 1 56, 183 (1980); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 308 (1966); see also Guard, Impotent Figureheads, supra note 156, 
at 357 (arguing that principles of stare decisis support the Court's holding in Lopez) . 
182. Lopez was decided the same Term as the Florida Prepaid and College Savings 
Bank decisions, both of which developed and extended the Boerne decision. See Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
Caminker, "Appropriate " Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra note 20, at 
1 1 47-49 (discussing application of Boerne in the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank 
decisions). 
183. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-83: 
As the Court recently observed with respect to Congress' power to legislate under the Four­
teenth Amendment "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall 
within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previ­
ously reserved to the States." 
/d. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)) (alteration in original). 
184. To be sure, the adequacy of congressional findings has become increasingly central 
in the Court's congruence-and-proportionality analysis in decisions post-dating Lopez. See 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-74 (2001 ); id. at 380-85 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000); see also supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing treatment of legislative findings in the Boerne decisions). Even so, Boerne addresses 
the congressional findings underlying the RFRA in some detail, and months after Lopez, 
Florida Prepaid again considered such findings to be of significant import. See Florida Pre­
paid, 527 U.S. at 639; Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997). 
185. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-84; see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-82 (discussing 
congressional findings supporting the 1975 extension of the Act and agreeing that the need 
for the extension was "unsurprising and unassailable" and that it was "plainly a constitu­
tional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. at 308-09 (noting extensive congressional findings underlying the 1965 VRA). 
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Boerne's progeny,186 but also by Justice Scalia, who voted with the 
majority in all of the Boerne decisions.187 So too, the Chief Justice and 
Justice Kennedy, who concur in Lopez, and Justice Thomas, who 
dissents, express no qualms about the validity of section 5, as amended in 
1982.188 The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy disagree with the major­
ity that section 5 of the VRA applies to nondiscretionary electoral 
changes. They concur in the judgment because they thought Monterey 
had exercised discretionary judgments in the case before the Court.189 
Justice Kennedy's opinion identifies no constitutional difficulty with 
section 5, so construed. Justice Thomas dissents alone, arguing that the 
Court's construction of section 5 contravenes Boerne's congruence-and­
proportionality standard. Requiring preclearance of nondiscretionary 
changes, he states, fails to remedy any constitutional wrong.190 But even 
Justice Thomas did not suggest that section 5 itself, as amended in 1982, 
is suspect under the Boerne doctrine. Lopez's affirmation of section 5 
was not, accordingly, the product of a divided Court. 
Of course, this affirmation could be of only limited significance. 
Lopez, after all, was primarily a case about a relatively narrow question 
of statutory interpretation and did not present a direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statute. The case was not litigated as a vehicle to 
explore the scope of congressional power under the Constitution.191 At 
the time, the Boerne decision was nearly two-years old, and while the 
Florida Prepaid cases were pending, the Court might not yet have appre­
ciated the potential breadth of the Boerne doctrine. Justice Thomas 
nevertheless alerted the Court that its construction of section 5 of the 
VRA implicated serious constitutional questions under Boerne and the 
Court responded with sweeping language affirming exceptionally broad 
congressional power. 
186. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J . ,  dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Florida prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
187. Justice O'Connor likewise joined the majority in Boerne's progeny, but dissented in 
Boerne itself because of her disagreement with the Court's analysis in Employment Division 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Florida 
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
188. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 289-98 
(Thomas, J ., dissenting). 
189. Id. at 288-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
190. See id. at 295-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that nondiscretionary actions 
cannot be motivated by unconstitutional conduct, and accordingly that Congress cannot reach 
them through enforcement legislation). 
191 . See, e.g., State Appellee's Brief on the Merits, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 
266 (1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for Appellee Monterey County, Lopez (No. 97-1396); Brief 
on the Merits for Appellant, Lopez (No. 97-1396). 
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As a result, Lopez magnifies the import of the Court's preservation 
of the VRA quartet in the Boerne decisions.192 Like the VRA decisions 
and in contrast to the Boerne cases themselves, Lopez defers to congres­
sional judgments regarding how best to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments.193 It suggests that stare decisis alone does not explain the 
Court's insistence that the cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach to 
City of Rome remain good law. Instead, Lopez suggests that the 
Rehnquist Court not only accepts the measures upheld in the VRA 
quartet but actually prospectively embraces congressional power to 
intervene intrusively into state affairs to block racial discrimination in 
the political process. 
B. Attempting Reconciliation: Voting Rights "Proper" in the 
Rehnquist Court 
The Rehnquist Court's determined preservation of the VRA 
precedent and its broad affirmation of federal power in Lopez appear 
even more puzzling given much of the Court's other contemporary 
voting-rights jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly, albeit not 
exclusively,194 read the VRA parsimoniously.195 These narrow readings 
of the VRA contrast with prior precedent196 and adopt strained read­
ings of congressional intent.197 These decisions thus seem to ignore the 
deference the Boerne decisions and Lopez suggest Congress enjoys 
192. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 129-30 (2003). 
193. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (adopting a broad construction of § 5 to re­
quire preclearance of nondiscretionary electoral changes implemented by a covered jurisdic- . 
tion); Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290 (1997) (requiring preclearance of a State's imple­
mentation of separate registration systems for federal and state elections after the National 
Voter Registration Act had set parameters for federal elections); Lopez v. Monterey . 
County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (construing broadly § 5 to block elections planned under an un­
precleared statute, even when the result may leave the jurisdiction without an electoral sys­
tem); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991) (adopting broad construction of § 5 to hold 
that judicial elections held pursuant to unprecleared statutes should have been enjoined). 
1 95. See, e.g. , Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (construing the pur­
pose prong of the VRA's § 5 to proscribe retrogressive intent and not an intent to dilute or 
invidious intent more generally); Bossier Parish /, supra note 30, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (hold­
ing that § 5 does not block preclearance of voting changes that violate § 2 of the VRA); 
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (adopting narrow construction of § 5 that deemed · 
nonretrogressive a districting plan under which a black-majority district went from repre­
senting one-tenth of the State's delegation to one-eleventh); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 · 
(1994) (holding § 2 of the VRA inapplicable to a challenge to the size of a local governing 
structure); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (holding § 5 of the VRA 
inapplicable to reallocation of authority among elected officials). 
196. See, e.g., Allen v. Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (finding that 
Congress intended § 5 to have "the broadest possible scope" and to reach "any state enact­
ment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way"). 
197. See infra note 225 and text accompanying note 243. 
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when legislating to block racial discrimination in voting.198 Shaw v. 
Reno199 and its progeny,200 moreover, hinder the easy imposition of race­
conscious districting practices that are central to the VRA's plan to 
foster political participation by racial minorities. Several scholars have 
charged that the Shaw cases manifest hostility to the political gains 
made by African Americans and other racial minorities as a conse­
quence of the VRA and the Second Reconstruction more generally.201 
These cases may be understood, however, as expressing a more 
particular concern. They manifest the Court's resistance to a particular 
type of race-conscious decisionmaking within the political process. 
The Court seeks not to mandate colorblindness,202 but instead to 
198. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text. 
199. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
200. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 1076 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw 
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
201. See, e.g. , KOUSSER, supra note 1; A Leon Higginbotham Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A 
Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1593, 1603 (1994) (suggesting that Shaw might be the "equivalent for the civil-rights juris­
prudence of our generation to what Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford were for 
prior generations"); Karlan, End of the Second Reconstruction?, supra note 1 ,  at 699 (argu­
ing that Shaw "perversely used the equal protection clause . . .  to make it harder for blacks 
to reap the benefits of reapportionment available to other cohesive groups"); Laughlin 
McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 271, 273-74 
(1995) (arguing the Court "has launched a counterrevolution which threatens to overthrow 
the gains in minority office holding so laboriously accumulated over the past 30 years"); 
Nowak, supra note 1, at 1113 (arguing that the Shaw decisions "made it impossible for the 
Attorney General to order or even encourage a state or local legislature to create legislative 
district lines in a way that would strengthen minority race voting power"); Jamie B. Raskin, 
Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 526-28 (1995) (describing Shaw's 
"naked and unprincipled pursuit of inequality" and arguing that "[u]nless it is assumed that 
whites have a presumptive constitutional right to be in a political majority, Shaw makes no 
sense"). 
202. The Rehnquist Court periodically celebrates colorblind decisionmaking, and some 
Justices laud it as a virtue and a constitutional mandate. See, e.g. , Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495, 512 (2000) (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment's "mandate of neutrality"); Vera, 517 
U.S. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing "that strict scrutiny is not in­
voked by the intentional creation of majority-minority districts"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 
(noting that the "central mandate" of the Equal Protection Clause "is racial neutrality in 
governmental decisionmaking"); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that "govern­
ment can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 
'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"); Metro Broad., Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J. ,  dissenting) (discussing "the cardinal rule that 
our Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group"); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(same); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that 
" [t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection 
Clause"). 
Shaw and its progeny do not, however, require race-neutral districting. Racially pre­
dominant districting is subject to strict scrutiny, while racially informed districting practices 
do not even trigger heightened review. See Easley, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (finding that race was 
considered in the redistricting process, but that it was not the predominant factor and thus 
that strict scrutiny was not required); see also Karlan, Easing the Spring, supra note 166, at 
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restrict what it sees as excessive reliance on racial factors. To date, it 
has deemed such reliance excessive when it has found that race had 
been used mechanically, visibly, and decisively in the absence of 
congressional authorization.203 
Shaw and its progeny identify an "analytically distinct" cause of 
action under the Equal Protection Clause that calls for the application 
of strict scrutiny when legislatures subordinate traditional districting 
factors to racial considerations, that is, when race is the predominant 
factor motivating the districting decision.204 Shaw itself focused on the 
unusual or "bizarre" shape of the challenged district, emphasizing that 
"reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter."205 
Subsequent decisions hold that the inquiry focuses on whether race-. 
based intent trumps other districting concerns, with district shape 
offering probative (but not necessary) evidence of such intent.206 
The Court has never, however, struck down a districting plan 
under Shaw that it thought Congress meant to require. The state 
defendants in each of the Shaw cases claimed that the dictates of the 
VRA mandated and thus justified the districting plans under chal­
lenge.207 In response, Shaw's progeny are careful to hold that the 
VRA, as enacted, amended, and subsequently interpreted by the 
Court,208 did not require the districting choice disputed in each case.209 
1573 (noting that "under the predominant purpose standard, not every use of race renders a 
plan constitutionally suspect"). 
203. The Court's recent decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003), supports 
this view. See infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text. 
204. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 
205. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. 
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre District�� " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (describing the analytical 
structure of the Shaw injury). 
206. See Miller, 515  U.S. at 91 6 (discussing plaintiff's burden); see also Richard H.  
Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Now at  War with Itself! Social Science and Voting Rights in the 
2000's, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Now at War with 
Itself!]; Richard H.  Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 
YALE L.J. 2505, 2539-40, 2548-50 ( 1 997) (discussing importance of district shape under Shaw 
and its progeny). 
207. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977-83; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 91 1 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 
925-28; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 653-58. 
208. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 ( 1986) (construing the 1982 Amend­
ments to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as authorizing a three-part test for vote dilution); see 
also William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil 
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 652 n.224 (1991 ) (describing the Gingles Court as "very 
liberally" applying the 1982 VRA Amendments). 
209. See Vera, 5 17 U.S. at 976-79; Hunt, 517 U.S. at 911-16; Miller, 515  U.S. at 923-27. 
Admittedly narrow readings of the statute enabled the Court to so hold. See, e.g., Rubin, 
supra note 144, at 106; cf Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-
66 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (rejecting, prior to Shaw, the notion that "a proposed district must 
meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness" 
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Indeed, five Justices expressly held, and the remaining four assumed, 
that compliance with the VRA constitutes an interest sufficiently 
compelling to justify the predominately racial-districting practices that 
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.210 
Absent this assumption, the Shaw cases would significantly narrow 
the realm in which congressional action is permissible. Recognition of 
a new claim under the Equal Protection Clause might seemingly be 
thought to enlarge the realm in which Congress may act by giving it an 
additional right to enforce. But absent power to define compelling 
interests within the Shaw framework, any additional authority derived 
from the Shaw decisions would necessarily encroach upon Congress's 
existing Section 5 power to combat racial vote dilution and other 
defects in the political process. The result would be not simply a 
reallocation of congressional power under Section 5, but a significant 
curtailment of it, much in the same way that the obligation to comply 
with both the Shaw decisions and the VRA circumscribes the range of 
districting options available to state districting authorities.211 
The assumption that compliance with the VRA constitutes a com­
pelling interest under Shaw suggests that race may predominate in 
districting decisions when Congress mandates it.212 Put differently, the 
Shaw decisions suggest that what otherwise might be deemed uncon­
stitutional conduct becomes lawful when authorized by Congress to 
block racial discrimination in voting. To be sure, the Shaw decisions 
and that "compactness" within the meaning of Gingles, and § 2 of the VRA is a "functional 
concept" that is met when "effective[] represent[ation]" is possible). 
210. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e assume without deciding that 
compliance with the [§ 2] results test . . .  can be a compelling state interest); id. at 990, 990-92 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "compliance with the results test of VRA § 2(b) is a 
compelling state interest"); id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ven if strict 
scrutiny applies, I would find these districts constitutional, for each considers race only to the 
extent necessary to comply with the State's responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act 
while achieving other race-neutral political and geographical requirements"); id. at 1046 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing as significant Justice O'Connor's concurring position 
"that compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest"); Hunt, 517 
U.S. at 915 ("We assume, arguendo, for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance 
with § 2 could be a compelling interest . . . .  "). 
211 .  See, e.g., Stevens's dissent in Vera: 
Given the difficulty of reconciling these competing legal responsibilities, the political 
realities of redistricting, and the cost of ongoing litigation, some States may simply step 
out of the redistricting business altogether, citing either frustration or hopes of getting 
a federal court to resolve the issues definitively in a single proceeding. 
Vera, 517 U.S. at 1036-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 1045-46 
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("The price of Shaw I, indeed, may turn out to be the practical elimi­
nation of a State's discretion to apply traditional districting principles, widely accepted in 
States without racial districting issues as well as in States confronting them."). 
212. See Karlan, Easing the Spring, supra note 166, at 1586-87 (stating that the assump­
tion that compliance with the VRA can constitute a compelling interest "raise[s] the possi­
bility that congressional or executive understandings of equality that go beyond what the 
Constitution itself requires can provide a justification for race-conscious state action"). 
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hardly accord Congress unlimited discretion in this realm. They 
strongly imply, for example, that the mandates of the Equal Protection 
. Clause preclude Congress from requiring purely race-based district­
ing.213 The Shaw decisions nevertheless imply that the Court thinks 
special solicitude is appropriate when Congress frames measures to 
block racial discrimination in voting. 
This solicitude is absent, however, when decisionmakers act in the 
absence of congressional authorization. In the Shaw cases, the Court 
found that the state defendants permitted race to predominate in the 
absence of congressional authorization. Instead, the Court concluded 
that each districting plan had been shaped by the actual or anticipated 
demands of the Department of Justice within the preclearance 
process. As noted earlier,214 under section 5 of the VRA, covered 
jurisdictions must demonstrate, either to the Attorney General or to 
the federal district court in Washington, D.C., that a proposed change 
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or membership 
in a language minority group.215 The effects-based prong of this stan­
dard, in contrast to its prohibition on intentional racial discrimination, 
necessarily requires racially informed decisionmaking.216 But while the 
Rehnquist Court accepts as permissible race-consciousness of this 
sort,217 it has long thought that the DOJ has relied excessively on race 
in exercising its authority within the section 5 preclearance process.218 
Several decisions charge that the DOJ has impermissibly required 
covered jurisdictions to create the maximum number of black-majority 
districts possible, regardless of whether such districts captured com­
munities of interest.219 The Court has held that the DOJ's pursuit of 
213. See, e.g. , Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16. 
214. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
215. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1 973b(f)(2) (2000); Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 
201, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (1975). Covered jurisdictions may seek preclearance either from the 
Attorney General or from the district court in D.C. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
216. See supra note 1 44. 
217. See, e.g. , Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); supra notes 165-178 and 
accompanying text. 
218. See Katz, Federalism, Prec/earance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 
1 180-81, 1212-14 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's mistrust of the Department of Justice). 
21 9. See, e.g. , Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 85-86 (1997) (noting that the Georgia 
legislature had "yielded to the Justice Department's threats, [and] it also adopted the Justice 
Department's entirely race-focused approach to redistricting - the max-black policy"); id. 
at 87 (finding "strong support . . .  for finding the second majority-black district . . .  resulted in 
substantial part from the Justice Department's policy of creating the maximum number of 
majority-black districts"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (stating that "[i]t appears 
that the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing 
the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (noting evidence of Georgia's "predominant, overriding desire" to cre­
ate three black-majority districts to satisfy Department of Justice); id. at 924 (noting that 
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this "black-max" policy violates the VRA and the Constitution.ZZ0 
Concerned that the Department of Justice has relied excessively on 
race within the preclearance process, the Court has sought to rein in 
its powers. It has construed the VRA narrowly in several recent cases 
addressing DOJ's section 5 powers. For example, the Court's two 
decisions in the Bossier Parish cases limit the discretionary judgments 
available to DOJ when evaluating preclearance submissions. The first 
Bossier Parish decision holds that section 5 permits implementation of 
electoral changes that violate section 2 of the VRA.221 It thereby 
largely removes from the ambit of the section 5 inquiry the multi­
factored queries into the existence of racial vote dilution that occur 
under section 2.222 The second Bossier Parish decision holds that sec-
" [i)nstead of grounding its objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would ap­
pear the Government was driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts"). 
Scholars disagree about whether the Court's perception of the Department of Justice's 
conduct is accurate. Compare Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 780, 804-05, 813 (noting that 
the Department of Justice "forced" covered jurisdictions to create specific number of ma­
jority-minority districts and withheld preclearance unless they complied), and Timothy G. 
O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 750 (1995) 
(arguing that "the legal foundation for the Justice Department's demand that North Caro­
lina and Louisiana craft two majority black districts or that Georgia draw three black dis­
tricts is, at best, dubious"), and Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44 
EMORY L.J. 911 ,  930 (1995) (noting concern "over the Justice Department's coercive role in 
bending local jurisdiction to its will" and that Voting Rights Section "has long assumed 
freewheeling power to object to districting plans that did not seem 'right' - that is, racially 
'fair' "), with Rubin, supra note 144, at 105-06 (disputing Court's characterization of the Jus­
tice Department's conduct), and Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and 
the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1 ,  34 (1998) (suggesting that the Justice 
Department's conduct disputed in Abrams v. Johnson was appropriate), and Thalia L. 
Downing Carroll, Casenote, One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? Abrams v. Johnson and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917, 944-45 (1998) (same). 
220. See, e.g., Shaw, 517 U.S. at 913 (noting that the Court "again reject[s] the Depart­
ment's expansive interpretation of § 5"); Miller, 515 U.S at 921 (noting that "compliance 
with federal antidiscrimination law cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged 
district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those 
laws"); id. at 925 (stating that "[i]n utilizing § 5 to require States to create majority-minority 
districts wherever possible, the Department of Justice expanded its authority beyond what 
Congress intended and we have upheld"); see also Katz, Federalism, Prec/earance, and the 
Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1212-13. 
221. Bossier Parish I, supra note 30, 520 U.S. 471 (1997). Section 2 prohibits any voting 
"standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . .  to 
vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). A voting practice is dilutive 
and violates § 2, 
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
the nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
(members of the protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other mem­
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice. 
42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1994). 
222. While not unbounded, see S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982) (listing factors 
informing totality of circumstances inquiry under § 2); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding 
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671-76 (2001 ), claims of racial vote 
dilution are indisputably complex. See, e.g. , Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by 
'Election' Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 173, 1 182 (1999) (noting that minority vote dilution 
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tion 5 permits implementation of electoral changes implemented with 
a discriminatory, albeit nonretrogressive, intent.223 It thus limits review 
to the facially straightforward assessment of retrogression, that is, 
whether the proposed change worsens the condition of members of a 
racial minority.224 Both decisions reflect the Court's hope that by 
curbing the discretion exercised by DOJ under the statute, it will block 
the DOJ from relying too heavily on race and thereby overstepping its 
authority in the future.225 
cases lead "the courts into complex fields of effective representation, fair distribution of 
governmental resources, and finally, equitable allocation of governmental power"). 
Proof of vote dilution under § 2 requires establishment of the so-called Gingles precon­
ditions. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting forth preconditions that 
a racial group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district," that the group is "politically cohesive," and that the majority "votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . .  usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate"). 
Section 2 also requires evidence that the totality of circumstances supports the dilutive qual­
ity of the practice. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994) . 
223. See Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) ; see also Katz, Federalism, 
Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1186-90 (discussing decision). 
224. The Court's past affinity for retrogression may have reflected its view that the 
measure is objective, clear, and easy to administer. See, e.g. , Bush v. Vera, 5 17  U.S. 952, 983 
(1996) (noting that " [n]onretrogression . . .  merely mandates that a minority's opportunity to 
elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's ac­
tions"); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994) (noting "there is little difficulty in discerning 
the two voting practices to compare to determine whether retrogression would occur"); Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993) (stating that "[a] reapportionment plan would not be narrowly 
tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably nec­
essary to avoid retrogression"). The standard, however, is more malleable than these decisions 
acknowledge. See, e.g., Abrams, 521 U.S. at 97 (holding nonretrogressive plan that reduces black­
majority district from representing one-tenth of the State's congressional delegation to repre­
senting one-eleventh); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 
Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 745-47, 749 (1998) (arguing that plan deemed nonretrogres­
sive in Abrams left State's African-American population "quantitatively worse off" and that 
the Court's treatment of retrogression makes no sense). Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498. 
(2003) , the Court's most recent section 5 decision, adopts a far more fluid understanding of 
retrogression, but nevertheless one that continues to curtail DOJ authority. See infra notes 
226-233 and accompanying text. 
225. See Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 
1 213-16. Without doubt, these constructions of section 5 accord Congress far less deference 
than the Boerne decisions and Lopez suggest Congress should receive in the realm of race 
and the vote. See also supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text (discussing deference). 
The Court did not simply suspend Chevron deference sub silentio, but also circumscribed 
DOJ discretion beyond what Congress intended. See, e.g. , Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, 
and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1192-1200 (identifying ways in which the statu­
tory constructions adopted in both decisions appear contrary to congressional intent); 
Rubin, supra note 144, at 92 (critiquing as "remarkable" and implausible the Court's assess­
ment of congressional intent in the second Bossier Parish decision). It did so, however, not in 
resistance to congressional power to block racial discrimination in voting but instead to 
block the DOJ from violating the statute. The decisions do not themselves restrict congres­
sional power to mandate the more broad readings of the statute rejected in each case. But 
see Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 336 (speculating that the rejected construction of § 5 "per­
haps . . .  rais[es] concerns about § S's constitutionality" but resting its holding on its finding 
that this construction "finds no support in the language of § 5"); cf Nowak, supra note 1, at 
1 1 19 n. 114 (arguing that the Court in Bossier Parish II did not rule on the scope of Con-
June 2003] Reinforcing Representation 2381 
The Court's recent decision in Georgia v. Ashcrojf-26 may be simi­
larly understood. At issue in the case was whether Georgia could 
permissibly replace some majority-minority districts with so-called 
"coalition" and "influence" districts.227 In coalition districts, black 
voters need not comprise the majority of a district's population to be 
able to elect representatives of choice, while influence districts permit 
minority voters to exert some sway in the electoral process, but not 
necessarily elect representatives of choice.228 The Court in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft was unanimous in holding that the VRA does not require 
that covered jurisdictions like Georgia mechanically retain majority­
minority districts whenever possible within constitutional constraints. 
All nine justices agreed that section 5 instead allows use of coalition 
districts as an alternative.229 A majority of the Court, moreover, held 
that the VRA permits covered jurisdictions to rely as well on influence 
districts to preserve minority voting strength.230 
Georgia v. Ashcroft holds that covered jurisdictions have the dis­
cretion to select among these districting devices,231 and that a jurisdic­
tion's decision to replace majority-minority districts with a mixture of 
influence, coalition, and majority-minority districts need not be retro­
gressive.232 The Court accordingly relies on a far more malleable 
conception of retrogression than it espoused in the Bossier Parish 
cases, which deemed the very rigidity of the retrogression to be among 
its primary virtues.233 Georgia v. Ashcroft nevertheless follows the 
Bossier Parish decisions by continuing to circumscribe the discretion 
of the Justice Department within the preclearance process. Georgia v. 
Ashcroft cedes to covered jurisdictions discretion unprecedented 
within the preclearance process to shape their electoral districts, and 
thereby restricts the ability of the Justice Department to use the newly 
identified fluidity in the retrogression standard to manipulate district­
ing decisions. That retrogression remains a meaningful curb on racial 
gress's power to enact legislation under the Fifteenth Amendn:ient). See generally infra Part 
III.A. 
226. 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003). 
227. See generally Pildes, ls Voting Rights Law Now at War With Itself!, supra note 206, 
at 1522 (defining and discussing coalition districts). 
228. Id. 
229. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 251 1-12; id. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
230. Id. at 2512-13. 
231. See id. at 251 1-13 (noting that, as between majority-minority and coalition districts, 
" [s]ection 5 does not dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over 
another."); id. at 2513 ("Section 5 leaves room for States to use these types of influence and 
coalitional districts . . . .  [T)he State's choice ultimately may rest on a political choice of 
whether substantive or descriptive representation is preferable."). 
232. Id. at 2515 (suggesting that Georgia "likely met its burden of showing nonretro­
gression"). 
233. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination remains to be seen. What is clear is that the ability of 
the DOJ to demand fixed numbers of majority-minority districts is 
greatly diminished. 
Finally, Holder v. HalP.34 and Presley v. Etowah County Commis­
sion, 235 appear to evince hostility to the VRA, but in fact rest on 
constructions of congressional intent that leave room for statutory 
amendments authorizing the proscriptions rejected in each case. At 
issue in Holder was the allegation that county governance by a single 
commissioner instead of by multiple commissioners elected from 
districts diluted the vote of the County's African-American commu­
nity, and thereby had a racially discriminatory result within the 
meaning of section 2 of the VRA.236 Holder holds section 2 inapplica­
ble to the challenge, finding that " [t]here is no principled reason why 
one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for compari­
son. "237 Presley holds that laws altering the powers exercised by elected 
county commissioners are not changes "with respect to voting" within 
the meaning of section 5 of the VRA, and hence not changes for which 
preclearance is required.238 Presley states that subjecting such changes to 
preclearance "would work an unconstrained expansion of [section S 's] 
coverage," and noted "appellants fail to give any workable standard to 
determine when preclearance is required."239 
The Court could have held otherwise in both cases, at least on the 
facts presented. The law altering the commissioners' powers in Presley 
had been adopted following a voting-rights lawsuit that altered the struc­
ture of the commission and resulted in the election of an African­
American commissioner.240 The contested law, accordingly, appeared to 
resemble the type of law section 5 was meant to address.241 In Holder, the 
234. 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
235. 502 U.S. 491 (1992). 
236. Holder, 512 U.S. at 876-79 (noting African Americans constituted twenty percent 
of the county's population and that this community was sufficiently concentrated and cohe­
sive to elect one representative to a five-person commission, if districts were drawn to allow 
black voters to do so). 
237. See id. at 881 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
238. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 503-08 (construing VRA § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (requiring 
preclearance if a covered jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualifica­
tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting dif­
ferent from that in force or effect" on designated dates)). 
239. Id. at 504-05. 
240. Id. at 522 n.23 and accompanying text; see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF 
THE MAJORITY 179-80 (1994); Rubin, supra note 144, at 64 n.181; Robert Bryson Carter, 
Note, Mere Voting: Presley v. Etowah County Commission and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 71 N.C. L. REV. 569, 593 (1993) (arguing that Presley engages in "hamstringing" that 
"frustrates the Act's congressional intent"). 
241. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 1 40 (1996) (stating that "Section 5 was a 
response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal 
courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck 
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predominant statewide practice of county governance by five-member 
commissions offered a potential benchmark against which to evaluate 
the County's reliance on a single commissioner to govern.242 Instead, the 
Court adopted narrow readings of the VRA in each case and thereby 
departed from prior decisions expressing the Court's view that Congress 
intended for the VRA to be given "the broadest possible scope."243 And 
yet, Holder's concern about the absence of a meaningful benchmark and 
Presley's wariness of the slippery slope reflect the Court's conviction 
that Congress had not intended the broad statutory construction prof­
fered in each case. Both decisions hold only that Congress did not 
authorize the restructuring of local governance plaintiffs sought in 
each case; they do not hold that Congress could not require such 
restructuring. 244 
III. BREACHING STATE AUTONOMY TO ASSURE STATE PRIMACY 
The Rehnquist Court, like the Waite Court before it, appears to 
recognize distinct congressional power to address racial discrimination 
in the political process. It painstakingly preserved the VRA precedent 
in the Boerne cases245 and affirmatively embraced sweeping congres­
sional power in Lopez .246 In developing the Shaw doctrine, it suggested 
that Congress possesses unique authority to require race-based deci­
sionmaking,247 and, even when it read the VRA narrowly, it preserved 
the possibility for the broad exercise of congressional power.248 The 
down"); see also Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J . ,  con­
curring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "statute contains no reservation in 
favor of customary abridgment grown familiar after years of relentless discrimination, and 
the preclearance requirement was not enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old 
poison into new bottles"). 
242. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 955 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that five­
person commission used widely throughout the State offered an appropriate benchmark); see 
also Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: {E}racing Democracy: The 
Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 1 14 (1994) (arguing that Holder "undermines 
Congress's decision to override local majorities whose election structures result in minority 
group exclusion"); Tucker, supra note 1, at 574 (arguing that Holder "substantially cut back 
on the 'broad construction' of the Voting Rights Act given by the Court in cases such as 
Allen and endorsed by Congress"). 
243. See, e.g. , Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978); Allen v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969). 
244. Congress has previously enacted more expansive statutes in response to narrow 
judicial constructions of them. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff 
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1991). That it will do so in 
connection with the VRA and specifically with section 5 when it expires in 2007 remains to 
be seen. 
245. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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Court has not, however, expressly explained why it seems to think that 
Congress enjoys special power to block racial discrimination in state 
political processes. 
While several rationales may explain the Court's approach, this 
Part argues that it is best understood in functional terms. Like the 
Waite Court, the Rehnquist Court accepts the deep intrusion into 
state sovereignty that results from the exercise of congressional inter­
vention to address racial discrimination in voting. It views such power 
as necessary to ensure state primacy over the protection of individual 
rights more generally. 
A. Reasons for Deference: Text, History, and the Functional View 
The Fifteenth Amendment expressly addresses racial discrimina­
tion in voting. It provides that a citizen's right to vote "shall not be 
denied or abridged" based on race, and, in Section 2, cedes to 
Congress "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."249 
It thus ostensibly offers a textual basis to explain judicial deference to 
congressional power in this realm. Reese and Cruikshank suggest that 
Congress has more power to address private conduct under the 
Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth and thereby appear 
to distinguish congressional powers under the two Amendments.250 
Lopez v. Monterey County arguably suggests a similar distinction by 
invoking the Fifteenth Amendment alone as providing constitutional 
authority for the enactment of section 5 of the VRA.251 
The language of Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, however, 
parallels that of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,252 and the 
modern Court has repeatedly insisted that congressional power under 
both sections is "coextensive."253 Accordingly, whether deferential or 
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
250. See supra rotes 93-104 and accompanying text. 
· 251. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999). 
1 . .  
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). 
253. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8· (2001) 
(noting that the two enforcement clauses are "virtually identical"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (citing precedent addressing Congress's enforcement powers under 
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Eighteenth Amendments without distinguishing among these 
grants of authority); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 ,  651 (1966) (noting similarity be­
tween Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments enforcement powers); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) ("The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of 
the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Con­
gress with relation to the reserved powers of the States."); see also Lopez, 525 U.S. at 294 n.6 
(Thomas, J. ,  dissenting) ("Although Boerne involved the Fourteenth Amendment enforce­
ment power, we have always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive."); City of Rome v. United States, 
446 U.S. 156, 208 n.l (1 980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (" [T]he nature of the enforcement 
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ngorous, review of legislation enacted pursuant to either section 
should be based on the same standard. The Court, moreover, has 
expressly held that both Amendments protect voting rights,254 and has 
deferred to congressional efforts to address racial discrimination in 
voting, regardless of the Amendment under which the Court under­
stood Congress to have acted.255 Constitutional text, standing alone, 
thus does not explain judicial deference to Congress in this realm. 
The long history of racial discrimination in voting in the United 
States certainly informs the Court's deferential stance. Professors Dorf 
and Friedman point out that when Congress enacted the VRA in 1965, 
"it was entirely plausible" for the legislature to conclude that racial 
animus motivated voting rules having a disparate racial impact, even 
where specific proof of invidious intent was unavailable.256 This plausi­
ble conclusion, in turn, permits judicial deference to federal legislation 
proscribing racially discriminatory effects in the voting realm, even 
absent detailed legislative findings linking intent and effect.257 The 
Boerne decisions permit Congress to assume this linkage for voting­
rights legislation enacted not just in 1965, but also in 1970 and 1975,258 
while Lopez v. Monterey County assumes the linkage for the 1982 
Amendments to section 5, as applied in the 1990s.259 
Still, history alone does not explain the Court's deferential 
approach. Racial discrimination in voting is not limited to the distant 
powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as 
coextensive."); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(noting that the language of both Amendments is virtually the same and that the courts 
should use the same standard to gauge the scope of congressional authority for both). 
254. See, e.g. , Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding the right to 
vote to be a fundamental right protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rey­
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (locating within the Equal Protection Clause authority for 
the principle of one person, one vote in apportionment). 
255. See, e.g. , Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding the constitutionality of § 5 of the 
VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (affirming validity of § 4(e) 
of the VRA as valid legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. at 658 (upholding § 4(e) of the VRA (exclusively) under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). ' 
256. Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126. 
257. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 305-09 (noting the extensive 
findings supporting the VRA), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658 (upholding § 4(e) 
of the VRA, adopted by floor Amendment with no accompanying legislative findings); see 
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12, 284 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dis­
senting in part) ("In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader 
brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding indi­
vidual cases and controversies upon individual records."). 
258. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (preserving VRA quartet); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 
159 (addressing the 1975 extension of § 5 of the VRA); Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12 (1970) 
(addressing the 1970 Amendments to the VRA). 
259. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-83 (upholding broad reading of § 5 of the VRA as ex­
tended in 1982); see also supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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past,260 but neither are other types of longstanding unconstitutional 
discrimination such as gender discrimination. The Court, however, 
routinely defers to congressional efforts to address racial discrimina­
tion in voting, but its treatment of congressional attempts to address 
gender discrimination is decidedly mixed. Whereas the Court in 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs upheld the FMLA 
as an effort to protect against unconstitutional gender discrimination, 
the Court in United States v. Morrison did not find the long and con­
tinuing history of gender discrimination in state criminal-justice 
systems sufficient to defer to Congress's assessment of the magnitude 
of the constitutional injury or to its selection of the appropriate 
remedy.261 Historical and persistent discrimination is accordingly not 
sufficient to trigger the Court's deference. 
Congressional efforts to address racial discrimination outside the 
voting context likewise consistently fail to elicit judicial deference. To 
be sure, blocking discrimination based on race is at the core of the 
Reconstruction-era Amendments. Described by the Slaughter-House 
Cases as their "one pervading purpose,"262 this aim arguably suggests a 
two-tiered approach in which Congress enjoys greater power to block 
racial discrimination under these Amendments than it does to regulate 
other types of conduct.263 A generation ago, Justice Black espoused 
this view, stating that "[w]here Congress attempts to remedy racial 
discrimination under its enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced 
by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments."264 The Boerne decisions support this 
approach insofar as they invalidate statutes, including some seemingly 
traditional civil-rights measures, which did not address racial discrimi­
nation, while preserving the VRA precedent, which did.265 Still, 
260. See, e.g., Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320, 347-49 (2000) (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing stipulated facts indicating resistance among 
white school-board members to the election of a black school-board member). 
261. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 625-26 (2000); id. at 630-31 n.7 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Gender Bias Task Force reports that Congress considered); id. 
at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing congressional reports documenting unconstitutional 
gender bias in state-court systems); see also supra notes 121 and 133 and accompanying text. 
262. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873) (describing the aim of 
the new Amendments to be "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish­
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the 
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him"). 
263. STONE ET AL. , supra note 63, at 434 (noting that Slaughter-House can be read to 
suggest such a two-tiered approach, with the Fourteenth Amendment read expansively to 
provide comprehensive federal protection of the newly freed slaves, but otherwise leaving 
"state resident's primary recourse for protection of rights [] to his own state government"). 
264. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 1 12, 129 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); see also Harper 
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 285-
86 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]n end of discrimination against the 
Negro was the compelling motive of the Civil War Amendments"). 
265. See supra Part II.A. 
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decisions by both the Rehnquist and Waite Courts refuse to accord 
special deference to Congress's efforts to address racial discrimination 
not directly implicating the political process. The Civil Rights Cases 
strike down Congress's effort to reach private racial discrimination in 
public accommodations while United States v. Harris invalidates simi­
lar efforts to block privately orchestrated, racially motivated 
assaults.266 So too, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena267 holds that 
race-based classifications authorized by Congress are subject to the 
same strict scrutiny City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 268 applies to 
race-based decisionmaking by state and local actors.269 Congressional 
efforts to grapple with racial discrimination do not, alone, trigger judi­
cial deference. 
Congressional authority to address racial discrimination in voting 
appears relatively circumscribed when compared with its power to 
protect a host of property and liberty interests under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While in fact potentially quite broad,270 the power to 
address racial discrimination in voting still seems unlikely to devolve 
into a plenary power.271 The Court could accordingly view deference 
to Congress here as less damaging to federalism values than is defer­
ence to other types of enforcement legislation.272 To be sure, to the 
266. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 12 (1883) (invalidating ban on racial discrimi­
nation in public accommodations found in the Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v. 
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating a federal antilynching statute meant to address 
widespread, unremediated violence against black southerners, applicable regardless of state 
dereliction of the guardianship role). 
267. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny applicable to a federal statute that pre­
sumed African Americans and other racial minorities to be "disadvantaged" and thus eligi­
ble for federal affirmative-action contracting program). 
268. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
269. Adarand potentially leaves room for judicial deference to congressional judgments 
regarding the need to rely on race in a decisonmaking process, but the Court has yet to so 
hold. See Adarand, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (dismissing case as improvidently granted). 
270. See infra notes 369-370 and accompanying text. 
271. Cf Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra 
note 20, at 1190-91 (noting that "[t]he ends authorized by this Section 2 [of the Fifteenth 
Amendment] are far more constrained than those authorized by Section 5 . . .  the latter 
touch upon a wide a variety of liberty and property interests in a wide variety of contexts;" 
and arguing that deferential review of § 2 legislation would not "functionally award Con­
gress a virtually plenary police power"); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126 
(evaluating whether the "narrower subject matter" of the Fifteenth Amendment means that 
the Court can "afford" to accord Congress greater deference). 
272. Professors Dorf and Friedman suggest, but ultimately reject, this explanation for 
the Court's approach to voting cases. Because Congress's enforcement power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment could become plenary, they argue that "the difference in wording 
and subject matter among the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments does not 
justify the narrower approach that the Court has lately taken toward the Fourteenth." See 
Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126. This conclusion depends on how the Court 
will address congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment in the post-Boerne 
world, something it has yet to do. Cf United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), 
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extent that congressional power here is not tethered exclusively to the 
Fifteenth Amendment,273 it is not necessarily more circumscribed than 
Congress's power to remedy age discrimination in state employment 
or gender bias in the criminal-justice system, problems over which the 
Court has accorded Congress little deference when structuring 
enforcement measures.274 
The bounded character of Congress's power to block racial dis­
crimination in voting may nevertheless help explain judicial deference 
to congressional efforts to address racial discrimination in voting. The 
congressional power may be seen as bounded insofar as its exercise 
renders more extensive federal legislation unnecessary. As Professor 
Issacharoff explains, "process-based claims can relieve a conservative 
judiciary of any obligation to police substantive distributional out­
comes of the policy decisions of elected political bodies."275 
Judicial deference to Congress in this realm reflects the assumption 
that individual liberty is best protected at the state and local level,276 
but only so long as state and local governments are democratically 
accountable.277 The next two Sections attempt to establish that this as­
sumption about state power and democratic representation underlies 
decisions by both the Waite and Rehnquist Courts. 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835 (2002) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) under the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
273. See supra notes 252-255 and accompanying text. 
274. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re­
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
275. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1869 (1992); see also Karlan, Easing 
the Spring, supra note 166, at 1591 : 
Regulation of the political process represents a decision to combat the risk of unconstitu­
tional discrimination on the wholesale level, by providing all citizens with an equal opportu­
nity to participate effectively in the political process, rather than leaving all enforcement to 
the retail level by enacting laws that impose equal-treatment obligations in indiscrete areas 
of state-government activity such as schools, public employment, or housing. 
276. See, e.g. , Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045 
(1997); see also David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitution­
alism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 491 (1999) (arguing that local governments "are often 
uniquely well positioned to give content to the substantive constitutional principles . . .  bet­
ter positioned in some instances, that is, than either federal or state institutions"); cf 
BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 59 (noting post-Civil War Republican "hope . . .  that the south­
ern states would do the job of protecting all their citizens' rights"). 
277. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) ("The presump­
tion of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational' classifications in other types of en­
actments are based on the assumption that the institutions of state government are struc­
tured so as to represent fairly all the people."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 1 8  U.S. 356, 370 (1880) 
(describing the right to vote as the "preservative of all rights"). 
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B .  Reinforcing Representation in  the Waite Court 
2389 
Sixty years before Justice Stone's famous footnote four,278 the 
Waite Court understood that racial discrimination inhering in the 
political process may prevent state governments from adequately pro­
tecting individual rights. Ex parte Yarbrough279 sustains Congress's 
power to block privately orchestrated, racially motivated violence 
affecting congressional elections. The decision is typically read to 
uphold virtually plenary congressional power to regulate federal elec­
tions, but to offer no support for analogous authority over state and 
local elections. 280 
Yarbrough, however, posits a functional understanding of congres­
sional power that suggests Congress also enjoys considerable authority 
to protect the integrity of nonfederal elections. Yarbrough assumes 
nontextual authority for Congress's power to regulate federal elec-
278. United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that 
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities"). 
279. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). Yarbrough sustained convictions obtained based on indict­
ments charging a private conspiracy to "intimidate" a black man, "on account of his race," 
"in the exercise of his right to vote for a member of congress," even though the underlying 
statutory provision blocked such intimidation without regard to racial motivation. Id. at 657. 
280. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 490 (stating that Yarbrough avoided the state­
action constraints of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "by determining that the 
right of a qualified voter to cast his ballot in a federal election was based on Article I, and 
the power of Congress to protect it did not depend on the post-Civil War Amendments"); 
Charles A. Kent, Constitutional Development in the United States, as Influenced by the Deci­
sions of the Supreme Court Since 1865, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 
BEFORE THE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 201, 
226 (1889) (reading Yarbrough to be exclusively about federal elections); Michael J. 
Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 62 n.42 (2001) (citing Yarbrough as precedent 
upholding congressional power under Article I, Section 4, to regulate individual action inter­
fering with the right to vote in federal elections); . Lawsky, supra note 96, at 806 n.142 
(Yarbrough addresses the right to vote in congressional elections); Nowak, supra note 1, at 
1107 & nn.54-55 (same); Michael S. Steinberg, Note, A Critique of the Current Method of 
Scheduling Primary Elections and a Discussion of Potential Judicial Challenges, 69 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 462 (2001) (citing Yarbrough as authority for "Congress's unique abil­
ity, indeed responsibility, to regulate the fair conduct of federal elections"); cf CHARLES 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1 862-1890, at 308 (1939) (dis­
cussing Yarbrough and stating that based on Article I, Section 4 "and from other provisions, 
a power is deduced to in5ure free and pure elections"). 
Historians dispute the significance of Yarbrough insofar as the decision is limited to fed­
eral elections. Compare Maltz, supra note 36, at 85 (noting that even if Yarbrough reached 
no further than federal elections, it offered Congress "substantial power" to block private 
efforts to prevent African Americans from voting; those seeking to interfere with registra­
tion would not distinguish federal from state elections, and many state and federal elections 
were held at the same time), with BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 66 & 152 n.42 (reading Yar­
brough as limited to congressional elections, and arguing that congressional power in this 
regard was inadequate given that "state and local elections were where the officeholders 
most directly affecting people's lives were chosen"). 
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tions. Article I, Section IV permits Congress to regulate congressional 
elections, but says nothing about presidential elections.281 Yarbrough 
nevertheless insists that " [i]t is essential to the successful working of 
this government that the great organisms of its executive and legisla­
tive branches should be the free choice of the people. "282 It deems 
critical congressional power to ensure that both the federal executive 
and legislative branches represent "the free choice of the people,"283 
notwithstanding the absence of textual support for this broad power. 
When Yarbrough was decided, moreover, the Court's concern for 
the representative quality of the federal legislature would have pro­
vided the basis for congressional power to reach state elections. At 
that time, state legislatures still selected United States Senators. 
Accordingly, the capacity of the U.S. Senate to represent "the free 
choice of the people" rested exclusively on the representative quality 
of the state legislatures selecting Senators.284 To be effective, congres­
sional power to protect the representative character of the Senate 
seemingly needed to encompass regulatory power over state legis-
lative elections as well.285 
· 
Most significant, however, is Yarbrough's discussion of the Four­
teenth Amendment. The Yarbrough petitioners relied on Fourteenth 
Amendment precedent restricting Congress's ability to reach private 
281. U.S. CONST. art. I ,  § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators."). 
282. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666. 
283. Id. ; see id. at 657 (noting that the government's "executive head and legislative 
body" are both elective and speaking of the federal government's "power to protect the elec­
tions on which its existence depends from violence and corruption"); see also Dan T. Coenen 
& Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past 
and Reforms for the Fulllre, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851 ,  887-88 (2002) (arguing that Yar­
brough "planted the seed" for recognizing congressional power to regulate the processes for 
the selection of presidential electors); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Con­
stitutional Struclllre of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. 
L. REV. 893, 984 (1997) (citing Yarbrough and stating that "the Court held that Congress has 
the power to regulate presidential elections because it must - because such a power must 
exist in a republic"); Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elec­
tions, 67 MICH. L. REV. I ,  33 (1968) (noting that "[w]hile the indictment in [Yarbrough] in­
volved only a congressional election and was based on intimidation of Negro voters - un­
doubtedly a special case under the fifteenth amendment - the reasoning of the Court went 
much further"); Steinberg, supra note 280, at 461-62 (arguing that Yarbrough's reasoning 
does not distinguish between congressional and presidential elections). 
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .  " (amending Art. I, Section 
3, which provided that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof')). 
285. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658, 666 (noting that Congress "must have the power to 
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption" and that 
it needs such authority to retain its legitimacy as "the free choice of the people," a condition 
that is "essential to the successful working of this government"). 
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action to support their claim that Congress could not block privately 
initiated assaults on black voters.286 This reliance on the Fourteenth 
Amendment precedent seems misplaced. The assault at issue in Y ar­
brough occurred during a congressional election. Article I, Section IV 
provides Congress ample authority to regulate such elections,287 and 
thus any strictures on congressional action taken pursuant to the Four­
teenth Amendment simply did not pertain. The assault, moreover, oc­
curred because the victim had exercised his right to vote. Prior to Y ar­
brough, the Fourteenth Amendment was generally not thought to 
protect the quintessentially "political" right to vote.288 Accordingly, 
the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription on state action and any 
limitation on congressional action that might follow from it ostensibly 
had no bearing on the question of congressional power to bar privately 
initiated assaults on voters in congressional elections.289 
Justice Miller's opinion for the Court in Yarbrough dismisses the 
defendants' reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment precedent. But it 
ignores both of these readily available grounds for doing so. 
Yarbrough elsewhere recognizes distinct federal power to regulate and 
protect federal elections,290 but makes no mention of this authority as a 
reason to reject the defendants' Fourteenth Amendment claims. And 
while the "political" nature of the right to vote might similarly have 
offered grounds to distinguish Fourteenth Amendment precedent, 
286. Id. at 665-66; see also Brief for Petitioners at 11 ,  Ex Parte Yarbrough, 1 10 U.S. 651 
(1884) (No. 75) (arguing that the Court had never "held that Congress has the power to pre­
scribe penalties, or to interfere with the sovereignty of the States, except to prevent the 
States, or their officers and agents, from overriding or disregarding the restrictions imposed 
upon the States themselves" by the new Amendments). 
287. See supra note 280. 
288. On the distinctions among civil, political, and social rights during Reconstruction, 
compare AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216-18 n. * (1998); and HYMAN & 
WJECEK, supra note 36, at 395-97; and EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND CONGRESS 1863-1869, at 118-20 (1990); and WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); and Roderick 
M. Hills, Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About Structure After All, 93 
NW. u. L. REV. 977, 993-94 & n.60 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra); with RICHARD A. 
PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 153-76 (1999) (describing the fluidity with 
which the terms civil, political, and social rights were used during Reconstruction); and Reva 
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing 
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 ,  1 120 (1997) (noting that " [d]istinctions among civil, po­
litical, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptual 
scheme of any legal precision"). 
289. A century after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
held the protection of voting rights to be within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See, e.g. , Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964); see also Hills, supra note 288, at 994-95 (describing these decisions as a "direct 
repudiation of the fundamental assumptions underlying the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
290. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658, 666 (noting that Congress "must have the power to 
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption" and that 
it needs such authority to retain its legitimacy as "the free choice of the people," a condition 
that is "essential to the successful working of this government"). 
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Justice Miller's opinion instead suggests that this right is within the 
· 
Amendment's ambit. Nearly a century before the Court expressly 
recognized the Fourteenth Amendment to protect voting rights,291 
Yarbrough states that "while it may be true that acts which are mere 
invasions of private rights" are, absent state action, "not within the 
scope" of the Fourteenth Amendment, "it is quite a different matter 
when Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of 
rights conferred by the Constitution of the United States essential to 
the healthy organization of government itself. "292 
According to the Court's opinion in Yarbrough, the defendants' · 
reliance on Fourteenth Amendment precedent was misplaced because 
the types of rights at issue in cases like the Civil Rights Cases and 
United States v. Harris are distinct from the one at issue in Yarbrough. 
The opinion implicitly categorizes the rights to nondiscriminatory use 
of public accommodations and to freedom from racially motivated 
assaults as "private rights" over which the states retain the primary 
authority and responsibility to protect.293 Precedent addressing such 
rights afforded the defendants "no aid in the present case,''294 because 
a black voter's right to participate in the political process free of racial 
discrimination is seen · to constitute a constitutionally protected right 
"essential to the healthy organization of government itself. "295 
Yarbrough accordingly posits the view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a hierarchy of rights. Regardless of the 
constraints that limit congressional power to reach private action in 
other realms, "it is quite a different matter" when Congress acts to 
protect these essential ones. Yarbrough suggests that Congress may 
prohibit private assaults on black voters in federal and state elections 
alike,296 because, absent such authority, "the very sources of power 
may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage, 
without legal restraint. "297 
Justice Miller's opinion is not concerned with identifying a textual 
source for this congressional power, noting that "it is a waste of time 
291. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
292. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666. 
293. See Maltz, supra note 36, at 86 (arguing that Yarbrough and Cruikshank "posit a set 
of preexisting rights whose protection is remitted to the state governments"). 
294. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666. 
295. Id. 
296. The basis upon which Yarbrough rejected the defendants' reliance on the Four­
teenth Amendment precedent indicates the Court did not think this congressional power 
was limited to federal elections. 
297. Yarbrough, l 10 U.S. at 667. Justice Miller's general reference to the "sources of 
power," as opposed to a more specific reference to the sources of congressional power or 
even federal power, supports reading Yarbrough as recognizing congressional authority to 
protect state and federal elections from racial discrimination. 
June 2003] Reinforcing Representation 2393 
to seek specific sources of power to pass these laws. "298 The opinion is 
more interested in identifying the necessity of this federal power in 
functional terms. Whatever the difficulties that may follow from 
"invasions of private rights," racial discrimination affecting voting 
rights is understood to work a distinct harm and to require a distinct 
remedy. According to Yarbrough, such discrimination interferes with 
the "healthy organization of government" and thereby renders states 
ill-equipped to protect individual rights and govern properly. 
Yarbrough does not question Cruikshank's assertion that the "duty 
of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights 
was originally assumed by the states, and it remains there."299 By 1884, 
however, the Court recognized that performance of this state function 
depended on the "healthy organization of government." Congress 
needed broad power to create the state and federal institutions neces­
sary for healthy representative governance within the federal system. 
The hope is that this power to reinforce representation at the local 
level will render unnecessary massive federal intervention supplanting 
state primacy in the protection of individual liberty. 
In this sense, Yarbrough builds on the Waite Court's decision four 
years earlier in Strauder v. West Virginia.300 Strauder holds that a state 
law blocking blacks from jury service violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Justice Strong's opinion for the Court suggests that the West 
Virginia statute might function to deny black defendants impartial 
treatment within the criminal-justice system.301 So understood, the law 
represents a straightforward violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.302 The Court, however, also appears to identify an equal protec-
298. Id. at 666. 
299. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see United States v. Cruikshank, 
25 F. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14, 899) (opinion of Bradley, J.) ("The affirmative 
enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves, unless something more is expressed, 
does not devolve upon [the United States], but belongs to the state government as a part of 
its residuary sovereignty."); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 63, at 435 (arguing that the 
Court's reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Civil Rights Cases "grew out of the 
same view of the states as the primary protector of individual rights that the Court expressed 
in Slaughter-House"); BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 65 (stating that Cruikshank held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had not "taken from the states primary responsibility for the pro­
tection of basic individual rights"); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 102 (noting that "the Waite 
Court sought to protect blacks within the framework of constitutional modifications that 
preserved a state-centered nationalism"). 
300. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
301. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309 (noting that "prejudices often exist against particular 
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate 
in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which 
others enjoy"); see also AMAR, supra note 288, at 272 & n.162; Hills, supra note 288, at 998-
99. 
302. See MALTZ, supra note 288, at .103-04 (noting view that the Equal Protection 
Clause "requires that the states make available on equal terms the mechanism necessary to 
enforce the rights created either by other provisions of the Constitution or by state law"); 
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tion injury suffered not by Strauder, but by the potential black jurors 
the state law excluded from jury service. Justice Strong's opinion 
states that West Virginia's express exclusion of blacks from the jury 
denied them "the privilege of participating equally . . .  in the admini­
stration of justice" and "all right to participate in the administration of 
the law, as jurors."303 The exclusion operated expressively as "practi­
cally a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their 
inferiority." It worked functionally as "a stimulant to that race preju­
dice which is an impediment to securing individuals of the race that 
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."304 
Prior to Strauder, the Fourteenth Amendment was not generally 
thought to guarantee black men the right to sit on juries.305 Strauder 
nevertheless holds that the Amendment provides this guarantee. The 
decision recognizes what Professor Hills calls the "tight unity" 
between defendant Strauder's right to an impartial trial and the 
participatory rights of potential black jurors.306 Justice Strong's opin­
ion, Professor Hills explains, upholds the rights of these excluded 
jurors in order to protect Strauder's right to a fair trial. Since review­
ing every jury verdict for impermissible racial discrimination is neither 
feasible nor desirable, Strauder seeks "to create the institutions neces­
sary for the vindication of private rights. "307 
Yarbrough, like Strauder, suggests that racial discrimination 
affecting state political institutions precludes States from adequately 
protecting individual rights. Institution building at the state level was 
essential to vindicate the rights guaranteed by the new Amendments 
while still preserving the federal structure. Events at the time demon­
strated that "private rights" would not be protected absent political 
institutions dedicated to their defense.308 Strauder shows the Waite 
Hills, supra note 288, at 997 (" [I]mpartiality in criminal trials is the quintessential civil right 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
303. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. 
304. Id. 
305. See, e.g. , Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 369 (1 879) (Field, J., dissenting); see also 
AMAR, supra note 288, at 273-74; PRIMUS, supra note 288; Vikram David Amar, Jury Service 
as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995); Hills, supra note 
288; Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 1014-23 (1995); Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accomodations and Pri­
vate Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1349-50 (1996); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of 
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles 
Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886-90 (1987). 
306. Hills, supra note 288, at 999; see also AMAR, supra note 288, at 272 (noting that 
Strauder "straddled the question of whose rights this scheme violated"). 
307. Hills, supra note 288, at 997; id. at 1000 ("[J]udicial regulation of the structure of 
juries seems like the only way in which a court can vindicate the civil rights that the [Four­
teenth Amendment's] framers unquestionably wished to protect."). 
308. Hills, supra note 288, at 980, 1001 (stating that "private rights divorced from gov­
ernmental structures were futile 'parchment barriers.' In order to be effective, rights must be 
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Court's willingness to mandate institutional change through direct 
constitutional interpretation. Yarbrough agrees that such institutions 
needed to be established, but does not itself reform the state institu­
tion. Instead, Yarbrough welcomes congressional participation in the 
endeavor. 
C. Reinforcing Representation in the Rehnquist Court 
City of Boerne v. Flores rejects Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion 
that Congress may enact legislation that "expands" Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.309 It is careful, however, to affirm two related 
rationales for Morgan's holding. One recognizes congressional power 
to ban New York's English literacy test as a remedial measure for 
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.310 The other, of 
more relevance here, upholds congressional power to ban the test as a 
mechanism to address discrimination in public services. Morgan states 
that the congressional ban offered New York's Puerto Rican commu­
nity "enhanced political power [that] will be helpful in gaining nondis­
criminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican 
community."311 Articulating what Professor Karlan has labeled the 
"prospective model of constitutionally corrigible invidious discrimina­
tion,"312 Morgan upholds section 4(e) of the VRA because it "enables 
the Puerto Rican minority better to obtain 'perfect equality of civil 
rights and the equal protection of the laws.' "313 Boerne affirms the 
validity of this rationale, stating that the exercise of congressional 
power "rested on unconstitutional discrimination in New York. "314 
That this "unconstitutional discrimination" had in fact occurred 
was essential neither to the Court in Morgan nor, notably, to the 
Rehnquist Court in Boerne. Morgan and Boerne cite no evidence 
suggesting that such discrimination had taken place and require no 
specific congressional findings corroborating speculation about such 
discrimination. Instead, Morgan invokes the extreme deference to 
Congress for which the decision is remembered, finding it sufficient 
that Congress could have found that such discrimination exists. 
Morgan insists that " [i]t is enough that we be able to perceive a basis 
embedding in a network of political institutions - juries, legislatures, constitutional conven­
tions, etc. - that help to define and enforce those rights" (footnote omitted)). 
309. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
310. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641, 654 (1966). 
3 1 1. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652. 
3 12. See Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 729. 
313. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
345-46 (1879)). 
3 14. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528. 
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upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. "315 So 
too, Boerne is apparently satisfied with the unsubstantiated assertion 
that section 4( e )'s effort to avert prospective discrimination "rested on 
unconstitutional discrimination in New York."316 
Even so, Boerne and its progeny hardly embrace the deferential 
stance Morgan employs. Morgan refuses to assess whether eliminating 
New York's literacy test is an effective means to address invidious 
discrimination in public services. Morgan states that only Congress can 
make such determinations.317 The Boerne decisions, however, establish 
that Congress does not have such unbounded discretion to craft 
remedies.318 Under Boerne and its progeny, Congress may not dimin­
ish the prospect of invidious discrimination in public services by, for 
example, abrogating New York's immunity from private suits alleging 
such discrimination. The Boerne cases bar Congress from creating 
such a regime, at least insofar as it acts in the absence of concrete and 
substantial evidence documenting such discrimination.319 
The Rehnquist Court nevertheless expressly affirms Morgan's 
embrace of congressional power to regulate state political processes as 
a means to diminish the prospect that invidious discrimination might 
occur. While Morgan suggests virtually complete congressional discre­
tion to select among a host of remedies, section 4( e) of the VRA looks 
good to the Court in Boerne because Congress selected precisely the 
remedy that it did. Section 4( e ), Boerne explains, is a vehicle "to give 
Puerto Ricans 'enhanced political power' that would be 'helpful in 
gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services.' "320 Boerne 
sees section 4(e) as an effort to fix the state's political processes in 
order to facilitate more responsive governance by the state itself. The 
statute is entitled to deferential judicial review because it is structured 
to maintain state primacy in the protection of individual rights. Boerne 
thus asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers refused to 
"giv[e] Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal equality,"321 
315. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653. 
316. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528. 
317. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (stating that " [i]t was for Congress . . .  to 
assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations" including "the effectiveness of 
eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil" and 
noting "[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors"). 
3 18. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
3 19. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text. 
320. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652). 
321. See id. at 521. For an argument that the Second Reconstruction achieves such pri­
macy, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 484, 1501 (1987) (arguing that " [a]fter Brown v. Board of Education and the vari­
ous civil rights acts, after the revolution in criminal procedure fostered by federal law and 
federal courts, after the imposition of uniform federal standards for basic liberties under the 
Bill of Rights, and after the proliferation of novel statutory 'rights' arising from the interven-
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while its preservation of Morgan suggests a willingness to defer to 
congressional judgments regarding the measures and institutions 
thought necessary to facilitate state fulfillment of this responsibility. 
The Court, of course, need not rely on Congress to reform state 
political institutions when a perceived defect in the political process 
threatens to prevent a state from adequately protecting individuals 
from discriminatory treatment. Bush v. Gore322 is but the latest in a 
series of the Court's decisions that dramatically restructure the 
processes of state governance based on newly derived constitutional 
mandates.323 To be sure, absent longstanding precedent and estab­
lished practice, the Rehnquist Court might have agreed with Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan that the Court should not enter the "political 
thicket" for fear of undermining the Court's moral authority,324 and 
decide cases based on political philosophy rather than law.325 The 
door, however, was already open and the Rehnquist Court made no 
attempt to close it.326 Indeed, it has extended the foray into the thicket 
by articulating new ways in which the Constitution mandates particu­
lar political structures at the state level.327 As Professor Pildes recently 
tions of the welfare-regulatory state, it is the federal government, not the states, that appears 
to be our system's primary protector of individual liberties"). 
322. 513 U.S. 98 (2000). 
323. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Unwelcome Judicial Obligation to Respect Politics in 
Racial Gerrymandering Remedies, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1404, 1428-29 (1997) (arguing that 
when lower federal courts craft remedies under Shaw and its progeny, they "subordinate 
states' political concerns to other, more sterile, redistricting criteria."); Katz, Federalism, 
Prec/earance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1201-02 (citing Shaw v. Reno in 
arguing that the Rehnquist Court long demonstrates a commitment to a "dramatic restruc­
turing of state governance"); Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 785, 786 (noting paradox in 
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny that "conservative judges extend the Equal Protection 
Clause . . .  beyond the reach of precedent to significantly displace state control over legisla­
tive districting" and that these decisions "offend conservative conceptions of federalism."). 
324. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) ("The 
Court's authority . . .  ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. 
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appear­
ance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of 
political forces in political settlements."). 
325. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1969) (Harlan, J., con­
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court was ill-equipped to decide 
whether a multimember system was more "effective" to minority interests than single­
member districts: " [u]nder one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all 
officers; under the other, minority groups have more influence in the selection of fewer offi­
cers"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
326. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (striking down New York 
City's governing Board of Estimate as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also 
Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
327. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (state judicial 
canon barring candidates in judicial elections from announcing their views on disputed legal 
issues violates the First Amendment); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 
(2000) (striking down the "blanket" primary as a violation of the First Amendment); Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (absence of uniform standards for assessing the voter intent on re­
counted ballots violates the Equal Protection Clause); cf Arkansas Educ. Television 
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observed, the Court "now routinely deploys constitutional law to 
circumscribe the forms democracy can take . . .  [and] almost reflex­
ively acts as if it were appropriate for constitutional law always to pro­
vide ready answers as to what makes democracy 'best. '  "328 
Decisions such as Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party v. 
Jones329 display the Court's confidence in its institutional capacity to 
identify constitutional rules governing democratic participation. Bush 
v. Gore reads the Equal Protection Clause to mandate consistent stan­
dards for assessing voter intent on disputed ballots.33° California 
Democratic Party holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit a state-mandated blanket primary, a practice that permits 
voters to vote, office by office, for any candidate on the ballot, 
regardless of the voter's or candidate's party affiliation.331 These deci­
sions necessarily limit congressional power to regulate state and local 
political processes pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.332 After Bush v. Gore, for example, Congress could not mandate 
that different standards govern the counting of dangling chads from 
disputed ballots in different jurisdictions, just as it is precluded from 
mandating unequal apportionment among electoral districts.333 So too, 
after California Democratic Party, Congress may neither authorize nor 
mandate a blanket primary. 
Even so, the decisions do not entirely foreclose congressional 
action. Bush v. Gore appears to leave open the possibility that 
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (First Amendment does not bar exclusion of third­
party candidate from televised debate); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
351 (1997). 
328. Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED 
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 156 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Constitutionalizing 
Democratic Politics]. 
329. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
330. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam) ("The formulation of uni­
form rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we 
conclude, necessary."). 
331. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 581-82, 585-86. 
332. Article I, section 4 permits Congress to regulate federal elections without regard to 
the constraints of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by 
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."). 
333. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-81 (1964): 
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a 
State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legisla­
ture, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. 
Id. ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (holding that Article I, section 2 "means that 
as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much 
as another's."). 
June 2003] Reinforcing Representation 2399 
Congress could mandate specific technology or a uniform federal 
standard to govern the recounts of disputed ballots. Such measures 
could arguably be deemed to enforce the right to equal treatment 
articulated in Bush v. Gore, and thus to satisfy Boerne's congruent and 
proportional standard.334 So too, California Democratic Party would 
seemingly allow Congress to prohibit the open primary, a practice that 
resembles the blanket primary except for the fact that it requires 
voters to select among the candidates from only one party in any given 
primary election.335 While California Democratic Party expressly 
declined to address the constitutionality of the open primary,336 the 
similarity between the blanket primary and the open primary suggests 
that Congress could bar the latter practice as a prophylactic measure 
to enforce the associational rights of political parties.337 
These decisions stand in curious relation to Shaw v. Reno and its 
progeny. Like Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party, the 
Shaw decisions read the Constitution to set forth a rule structuring 
democratic governance. They locate within the Equal Protection 
334. Cf Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential 
Elections: Lessons From the Past and Reforms For the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851 ,  
881-87 (2002) ("[T]he Court's recent equal protection ruling in Bush v .  Gore expands the 
range of potential Section 5 legislation in the presidential-election area[,]" while concluding 
that Boerne will preclude many of these efforts); Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and 
Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 683-89 & nn.307, 325 (2002) (citing a House Resolution 
and a report by the independent National Commission on Electoral Reform each of which 
would require states to "have in place . . .  uniform standards for defining what counts as a 
vote"). 
335. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 576 n.6: 
An open primary differs from a blanket primary in that, although as in the blanket primary 
any person, regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party's nominee, his choice is lim­
ited to that party's nominees for all offices. He may not, for example, support a Republican 
nominee for Governor and a Democratic nominee for attorney general. 
Id. ; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes: Political Parties, Asso­
ciational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 282-83 (2001) 
[hereinafter Private Parties With Public Purposes]; Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional 
Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 785 n.155 (2001 ). 
336. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 577 n.8. Commentators have noted that 
the structural similarities between the open and blanket primaries leave the more widely 
used open primary subject to constitutional attack. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, 
Point/Counterpoint: Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?,  149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 815, 830 n.60 (2001); Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes, supra note 335, 
at 284-85; Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 705-06 
(2001). But see Elizabeth Garrett, Law and Economics, 31 N.M. L. REV. 107, 131 (2001) 
(noting that open primaries pose less of a threat to associational rights than do blanket pri­
maries); The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 259, 278 & n.78 
(2000) (arguing that "open primaries appear to represent not a raid on the party by outsid­
ers, but merely an extreme loosening of the requirements for affiliation with a party" and 
that this "affiliation, though temporary, was the touchstone for the Jones Court." (internal 
citations omitted)). 
337. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding congressional ban on 
literacy tests); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. Of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (up­
holding constitutionality of literacy test). 
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Clause a prohibition against districting plans in which race predomi­
nates over traditional districting principles, absent narrow tailoring 
to a compelling governmental interest.338 And like Bush v. Gore and 
California Democratic Party, they limit congressional power while still 
preserving a realm for continued congressional action. The Shaw deci­
sions block Congress from authorizing racially predominant districting 
absent a compelling justification, but nevertheless assume that compli­
ance with the VRA constitutes a compelling interest.339 
The Shaw decisions, Bush v. Gore, and California Democratic 
Party, accordingly all articulate constitutional holdings that restructure 
democratic governance at the state and local level while leaving to 
Congress at least some authority to develop related rules. Given that 
Shaw and its progeny directly implicate racial concerns while Bush v. 
Gore and California Democratic Party do not, these decisions collec­
tively might suggest a degree of judicial receptivity to broad congres­
sional regulation of state voting regimes, regardless of whether the 
local practices involve issues of racial representation. 
To be sure, the Shaw decisions more expressly invite congressional 
participation in the federal project of reinforcing representation at the 
state level than do Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party.340 
But this facet of Shaw and its progeny may stem simply from the fact 
that the state defendants in these cases expressly invoked the federal 
VRA as justification for their districting decisions, and thus may not 
signal greater congressional authority in the realm of race and the 
vote. If so, underlying the Boerne doctrine's preservation of the VRA 
precedent may be an as yet evolving theory that Congress has consid­
erable leeway to devise measures influencing state voting and repre­
sentational regimes even outside the race context. Indeed, Boerne's 
affirmation of Morgan's observation that state governments may be 
insufficiently responsive to those excluded from the political process 
suggests a willingness to defer to Congress when it acts to address such 
exclusions, regardless of whether racial discrimination is the cause.341 
Put differently, the Court's confidence in its own institutional compe­
tence to "constitutionalize democracy" does not necessarily preclude 
congressional power to legislate at the margins with prophylactic rules. 
338. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
340. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (assuming arguendo that compli­
ance with the Voting Rights Act can be a compelling state interest); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 
899, 915 (1996) (same). 
341. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997) (affirming Morgan's "ration­
ale" upholding § 4(e) of the VRA on the ground that Congress may bar literacy tests as a 
mechanism to address discrimination in public services); see also supra notes and accompa­
nying text and infra notes and accompanying text. 
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And yet, the Shaw decisions suggest that the Court is more recep­
tive to congressional participation in regulating state political 
processes when Congress acts to address racial discrimination affect­
ing voting rights. Shaw and its progeny suggest that Congress may 
authorize rules structuring the political process that the Court would 
deem unconstitutional if authorized by another governmental entity. 
Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party do not appear to 
recognize a distinct congressional power of this sort. In this sense, 
these decisions suggest that Congress is entitled to more deference 
when it legislates in the realm of race and the vote than when it acts 
elsewhere.342 
Such divergent receptivity appears puzzling. The warrant for 
exclusive judicial action defining rules of democratic participation 
seems strongest in cases involving both racial discrimination and the 
right to vote. After all, when racial discrimination affects the right to 
vote, it implicates two distinct grounds long thought independently to 
warrant rigorous judicial review.343 
Insofar as the Court is more receptive to congressional power in 
this realm, the nature of the rules regarding which the Court looks to 
Congress offers an explanation. Rules governing political participation 
necessarily affect political outcomes. As a leading casebook explains, 
"the election process emerges from previously fixed - and often care­
fully orchestrated - institutional arrangements that influence 
the range of possible outcomes that formal elections and subsequent 
policymaking can achieve."344 But while all rules sounding in electoral 
"process" invariably shape substantive outcomes, only some rules 
predictably redistribute political spoils among identifiable groups. The 
Rehnquist Court may look to Congress to create the mechanisms 
needed to address racial discrimination in the political process because 
342. So too, the Court's decision in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), implicitly pre­
serves a realm for concurrent congressional action. Rice struck down as a violation of the 
Fifteenth Amendment a state law that provided that only "Hawaiians" could vote for trus­
tees of the State's Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), a public agency that oversees pro­
grams designed to benefit the State's native people. The Court held that the restriction lim­
iting the OHA electorate to descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands 
embodied a racial classification that denied non-Hawaiians the right to vote within the 
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to 
Vote After Rice v. Cayeteno, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2000) (discussing Rice). Rice invalidates 
a state program that did not implicate the federal government's unique relationship and 
obligation toward its native people, and thus potentially leaves room for congressional 
action. 
343. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (suggesting that 
courts should rigorously review "legislation which restricts those political processes which 
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" as well as con­
duct reflecting "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . .  which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi­
norities"). 
344. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 1 .  
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it views those mechanisms to be unavoidably outcome-based in this 
redistributive sense. That is, it may see these mechanisms not simply 
as procedural regulations, but as devices for deciding winners and 
losers within the political system. Electoral rules derived to address 
racial vote dilution, for example, purposefully shift political power to a 
discrete and identifiable group of voters. 
By contrast, decisions such as Bush v. Gore and California 
Democratic Party articulate process-based holdings that less clearly 
redistribute political benefits to identifiable groups. For all the charges 
of partisanship Bush v. Gore generated,345 the legal rule it announces 
- in contrast to the remedy it forecloses346 - appears to be a neutral 
and objective one. More so than one-person, one-vote, the require­
ment that a uniform standard govern the assessment of recounted 
ballots does not facially favor any particular substantive outcome.347 So 
too, even if, as its supporters contend, the blanket primary favors 
more moderate candidates, this result does not consistently redistrib­
ute power among identifiable groups in the same sense that racial vote 
dilution claims do. 
IV. CONCLUSION: KEEPING A NONPLENARY POWER NONPLENARY 
Recognition of congressional power to address racial discrimina­
tion in state political processes, if understood in functional terms, 
arguably demands recognition of congressional power to target politi­
cal-process disruptions that transcend racial discrimination. In United 
States v. Reese, the Waite Court appeared to reject expressly the 
possibility that Congress may intervene in state political processes 
absent racial discrimination.348 But by the time the Court decided 
Yarbrough, the Waite Court appeared more receptive to that pros­
pect, equating the corruption stemming from the "free use of money 
in elections" with the racially motivated "lawless violence . . .  out­
rage," and suggesting that both endanger good government.349 This 
345. See, e.g., VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRA y AL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME 
COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT (2001); ALAN M. 
DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 
(2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1723-24 (2001 ); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They 
Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (2001). 
346. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 
1 10 YALE L.J. 1407, 1429-31 (2001); Klarman, supra note 345, at 1732-34; Larry D. Kramer, 
The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 152-57 
(2001); Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. 
Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 630-35 (2002). 
347. See Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: A Tally of Two Countries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2000, at A33 (discussing the importance of uniform standard for recounts). 
348. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
349. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884). 
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observation implied previously unacknowledged congressional power, 
but the Waite Court ended before it could explore the doctrinal con­
sequences. The Fuller Court that followed proved far less receptive to 
congressional action in the electoral arena.350 
So too, the scope of the Rehnquist Court's deference to congres­
sional action in the electoral arena remains unclear. The deference 
accorded Congress in the realm of race and the vote suggests defer­
ence of a broader sort to electoral regulation more generally. Recent 
decisions addressing the constitutional contours of democratic partici­
pation can be reconciled with such deference, but hardly establish it. 351 
The extent of judicial deference to congressional power to regulate 
elections will be determined by future decisions by this Court, or its 
successor. 
Existing precedent nevertheless makes clear that while extensive, 
Congress's power to block racial discrimination in voting is far from 
plenary. Boerne states that Congress may not expand the rights pro­
tected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.352 Thus, deference 
notwithstanding, the Court would not permit Congress to mandate a 
departure from the one-person, one-vote principle as a mechanism to 
remedy racial discrimination in the electoral process.353 An attempt to 
authorize purely race-based districting, without regard to the existence of 
communities of interest, is likewise sure to fail. Even if the Shaw cases 
could be read to leave open the possibility that Congress retains such 
authority,354 the Court would no doubt view congressional legislation of 
this sort to embody the type of race-conscious decisionmaking it under­
stands the Equal Protection Clause to proscribe.355 
Section 2 of the VRA will test the limits of the Court's deference 
to Congress's efforts to block racial discrimination in voting. As 
amended in 1982, section 2 prohibits any voting "standard, practice, or 
procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . .  to 
vote on account of race or color."356 The constitutionality of the statute 
is an open question.357 In significant respects, section 2 resembles the 
350. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); see also supra note 104. 
351 .  See text following supra note 339. 
352. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
353. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (construing the Equal Protection 
Clause to mandate equal apportionment among electoral districts). 
354. See infra notes 207-210 and accompanying text. 
355. See, e.g. , Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995) (suggesting that if § 5 of the 
VRA authorized the Department of Justice's black-maximization policy, it would raise "se­
rious constitutional concerns"). 
356. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). 
357. Commentators dispute the validity of § 2 under the Boerne doctrine. Compare 
David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional En­
forcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 31 ,  45-46 (arguing that § 2 remains consti­
tutional), and Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 726 
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statutory provisions the Court invalidated in Boerne and its progeny. As 
it did with RFRA,358 Congress amended section 2 to "restore" a legal 
standard expressly rejected by the Court as not constitutionally 
mandated. Congress amended section 2 to create a results-based test for 
racial discrimination because it disagreed with Mobile v. Bolden, which 
construed the Fifteenth Amendment to proscribe intentional discrimina­
tion only.359 Also like RFRA, section 2 is based on relatively sparse 
findings of intentional discrimination,360 applies nationwide, has no 
termination date, and proscribes substantially more conduct than does 
the Constitution.361 
None of these characteristics, however, appears problematic if the 
Court evaluates section 2 under the VRA precedent preserved in the 
Boerne decisions and with the deference accorded in Lopez.362 Indeed, 
in 1 982, the adequacy of congressional authority to adopt a results­
based test for racial discrimination after Mobile prompted relatively little 
discussion.363 The five pages the Senate Report devoted to the subject 
invoke the VRA precedent later preserved in the Boerne cases.364 They 
attest to congressional authority to enact measures "going beyond" 
(same), and Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2537, 2544 (1998) (same), and Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Com­
prehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132-
35 (2000) (same), with Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749-50 (1998) (noting that " [t]he political history of the 1982 
[Amendments to § 2 of the VRA], and the structural relationship of the statutory and consti­
tutional standards, are indistinguishable from RFRA"), and Guard, Impotent Figureheads, 
supra note 156 (arguing that § 2 cannot be distinguished from the statutes invalidated under 
Boerne). See also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 859-66; Erwin Chemerin­
sky, The Rehnquist Court and Justice: An Oxymoron, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 38 
(1999); Gerken, supra note 222, at 1736-37. 
358. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (RFRA was enacted to "overrule" 
Employment Division v. Smith). 
359. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982). As 
originally enacted, § 2 of the VRA tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, and 
thus was thought to add nothing to the constitutional prohibition itself. See Chisom v. Roe­
mer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991) (Section 2 as originally enacted "was unquestionably coexten­
sive with the coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment"); Guard, Impotent Figure­
heads, supra note 156; Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60-61 ("[I]t is apparent that the language of § 2 no 
more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, . . .  [and] that it was intended 
to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."); see also 
!SSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24. 
. 
360. Compare S. REP. No. 97-417, with Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (rejecting as inadequate 
lengthy congressional findings). 
361. See supra notes 221-222. 
362. See Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136; see also supra 
notes and accompanying text. 
363. But see Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Ex­
ploration of the Conflict Between the Judicial "Intent" and Legislative "Results" Standards, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 739-52 ( 1982). 
364. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39-43 & n.149. 
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direct constitutional requirements so long as such measures are "appro­
priate and reasonably adapted to protect citizens" from a constitutional 
violation.365 The results test was so adapted, the Report continued, given 
the difficulties plaintiffs encounter in proving discriminatory intent on a 
case-by-case basis, and the fact that practices that violate the results test 
"perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination."366 At the time, 
the Court did not even deem the question of congressional authority 
worthy of full consideration and summarily affirmed a lower-court 
decision that held the amended statute to be appropriate enforcement 
legislation.367 In recent years, however, individual justices have raised 
questions about section 2's validity.368 
Section 2's survival accordingly depends on whether the Court thinks 
the statute better resembles the VRA provisions upheld in the VRA 
precedent and Lopez than it does the statutory provisions challenged in 
the Boerne decisions. A functional understanding of congressional power 
to block racial discrimination in voting would permit the Court to deem 
section 2 appropriate enforcement legislation. 
The Court may, however, be unwilling to do so. If understood in 
purely functional terms, the Court's preservation of the VRA precedent 
in the Boerne cases and its affirmance of the VRA in Lopez v. Monterey 
County suggest a congressional power that is potentially quite expansive. 
Preserving state primacy to protect individual rights through the regula­
tion of the political process logically encompasses more than the corrup­
tion caused by racial discrimination. But even if the task were so limited, 
the realm in which racial discrimination corrupts political processes is not 
naturally circumscribed. What constitutes a racial classification is itself a 
contested question,369 while the conduct that affects political processes is 
neither self-evident nor necessarily bounded.370 The Court may well find 
365. Id. at 40. 
366. Id. 
367. Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984) (affirm­
ing Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss. 1984)); United States v. Marego County 
Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1 556-63 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 372-75 
(5th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 342-49 (E.D. La. 1983) . 
368. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (O'Connor, J. ,  concurring) (noting that 
the Court has "assume[ed], but never directly address[ed]" the constitutionality of § 2 and 
that § 2 is to be assumed constitutional "unless and until current lower court precedent is 
reversed and it is held unconstitutional"); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028-29 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (writing separately to emphasize decision is one of statutory interpretation and 
that " [n]othing in today's decision addresses the question whether § 2 . . .  is consistent with 
the requirements of the United States Constitution"). 
369. See, e.g. , Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000) (stating that not all classifica­
tions based on ancestry are race based, but the one before the Court is). 
370. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 1 15  HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) ; Lawsky, supra note 96, at 786 
(arguing that VA WA is a valid enactment under the Nineteenth Amendment because politi-
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that the seemingly limited realm in which it presently defers to congres­
sional action is not so limited at all. 
Indeed, the Court may already think so. The Court has recently 
insisted that the Fifteenth Amendment does not proscribe racial vote 
dilution,371 a claim that largely eliminates the Amendment as a source for 
congressional authority to enact section 2 of the VRA. Locating the pro­
scription against racial vote dilution solely within the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be of no consequence if, in fact, Congress's 
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
are "coextensive."372 The Court, however, may be moving toward distin­
guishing the two powers in order to narrow the realm in which it will 
defer to congressional action. 
The Court's goal may be to accord deference only when Congress 
legislates pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. Such a move would 
repudiate considerable precedent373 and largely abandon the functional 
understanding of Congress's enforcement powers that has marked the 
Court's approach to date. If the Court adheres to its recent claim that 
intentional vote dilution does not deny or abridge the right to vote within 
the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment, it would mean the demise of 
section 2 of the VRA. By both limiting its deferential stance to the 
Fifteenth Amendment and excluding racial vote dilution from that 
Amendment's ambit, the Court would almost certainly render section 2, 
with its proscription against such dilution, invalid under the Boerne 
precedent. To be sure, the Court would still confront occasional claims of 
intentional racial vote dilution brought directly under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.374 Eliminated would be the far more numerous result­
based dilution claims now brought under Section 2. 
Distinguishing congressional power under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments evokes the approach taken by Justice Kennedy's 
plurality opinion in Presley v. Etowah County Commission375 to limit the 
reach of the VRA. Presley holds that laws altering the powers exercised 
by elected county commissioners are not changes "with respect to 
voting" under section 5 of the VRA and accordingly not changes for 
which preclearance is required. Justice Kennedy's opinion insists that 
laws "with respect to voting" may be distinguished from the operational 
provisions that render local governance possible.376 The distinction is a 
cal citizenship "requires the ability to participate, free from domination, as a self-determined 
individual"). 
371. See Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (stating that the Fifteenth 
Amendment does not proscribe vote dilution). 
372. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
374. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gerken, supra note 222, at 1737. 
375. 502 U.S. 491 (1 992). 
376. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 494; supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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formal one that is difficult to defend in functional terms, or to reconcile 
with the precedent.377 Instead, it reflects the perception that the VRA 
was not meant to supplant local governance entirely. The Court thought 
a line needed to be drawn and accordingly drew it.378 
The Court might similarly distinguish between Congress's enforce­
ment powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in order 
to narrow the realm in which it will defer to congressional judgments. 
But even if the Court adheres to precedent and retains its view that 
Congress's powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are 
coextensive, section 2 of the VRA remains vulnerable. The Court may 
well be uneasy with the manner in which Congress exercises its power to 
address racial discrimination within the political process. Critics of John 
Hart Ely's argument that courts should police and cure defects within 
political processes charge that the endeavor is impossible absent an out­
come-based view of what the political process should produce.379 Absent 
such a view, the argument goes, courts will have no way of knowing 
whether the political process is failing. The same, of course, may be said 
about congressional efforts to reinforce representative governance at the 
local level. Such efforts might as easily be creating defects in the political 
process as curing them. 
Equality in the political process is no more easily defined than equal­
ity in political outcomes. The formal equality to make contracts and own 
property hardly gives rise to equality in wealth or business opportunity. 
So too, formal equality to cast a ballot - indeed, even an undiluted 
ballot - does little to ensure equality in the distribution of political 
resources like money and incumbency.380 Efforts to rectify either practi-
377. A law that replaces an elected office with an appointed one is arguably a change "with 
respect to voting" because voters no longer influence a decision they previously controlled. See 
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). A law that diminishes the powers exercised 
by an elected officials arguably implicates a similar interest. 
378. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 509 (stating that "[t]he Voting Rights Act is not an all­
purpose antidiscrimination statute."). 
379. See, e.g. , Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981) (arguing 
that "most instances of representation-reinforcing review demand value judgments not dif­
ferent in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort . . .  [and] the parties' claims in fun­
damental values case are often directly translatable into representation-reinforcing claims"); 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) ("[T]he constitutional theme of perfecting the processes of gov­
ernmental decisions . . .  by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are 
specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values -
the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid."); Mark Tushnet, 
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 
89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980) ("[I]dentifying functional obstacles [to the assertion of politi­
cal power] both permits manipulation, which violates the restraint principle, and requires the 
use of objective values."). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980). 
380. See, e.g. , Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 1553 (2002). 
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cal inequality may offend the formal equality in each context.381 Redis­
tributing wealth threatens interference with contract or property rights 
while creating special districts or increasing the number of votes cast by 
the politically disadvantaged arguably conflicts with formal political 
equality. 
Such concerns may lead the Court to extend the constitutionaliza­
tion of democratic governance employed in cases like Bush v. Gore 
and California Democratic Party. Most dramatically, the Court could 
hold that the substantive dictates of the Equal Protection Clause bar 
the race-consciousness that inheres in section 2's ban on discrimina­
tory results and indeed in any law barring racially discriminatory 
effects. Such prohibitions require those governed by them to consider 
race expressly or risk violating the proscription.382 Decreeing the 
Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe such considerations would 
overrule considerable precedent,383 and invalidate numerous civil­
rights measures.384 It would constrict Congress's enforcement powers 
to unprecedented levels. 
The acceptance of race-conscious decisionmaking evident in 
several recent decisions suggests the Court is unlikely to hand down 
such a sweeping decision. Even so, other decisions energetically locate 
within the Constitution's text substantive norms dictating specific demo­
cratic structures. These newly articulated constitutional rules suggest a 
mechanism to limit congressional regulatory power over the political 
process. Novel constructions of the Equal Protection Clause that 
constrict such power are accordingly not implausible. The "constitution­
alization of democracy" may well be an ill-advised institutional endeavor 
in its own right.385 As a vehicle for limiting congressional power, it 
threatens to obliterate it entirely. 
381. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (1987) (argu­
ing that in both Lochner and Buckley "the existing distribution of wealth is seen as natural, 
and failure to act is treated as no decision at all. Neutrality is inaction, reflected in a refusal 
to intervene in markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth"). 
382. See, e.g., Katz, Federalism, Prec/earance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, 
at 1205 (making this point); Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 825 (noting that under both § 2 
and § 5 of VRA "race is a privileged criterion" and that "[t]he legislature and everyone who 
participates in the process must begin with race"); Erickson, supra note 144, at 421. 
383. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. 977 (2000); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 
U.S. 266 (1999). 
384. See, e.g. , Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000, 1001 (2d Cir. 1 991)  (discussing 
how Fair Housing Act's effect-based ban on racial preference in advertisements permissibly 
leads to race-conscious decisionmaking). 
385. See Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, supra note 328, at 159. 
